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EXECUTIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now go into executive session to consider the nomination of Mr. William E. Colby to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of William E. Colby, of Maryland, to be Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the debate on the nomination of Mr. William E. Colby to be Director of Central Intelligence, Messrs. T. Edward Braswell, Jr., R. James Woolsey, and John A. Goldsmith, members of the staff of the Committee on Armed Services, be granted the privilege of the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Charles Stevenson, a member of my staff, be allowed the privilege of the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the consideration of this nomination, Ellen Frost, Murray Flander, and Roy Greenway have the privilege of the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I should just like to detain the Senate floor for 1 minute in behalf of the nomination of Mr. William E. Colby to be the head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

First, I commend the acting chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri, for the able, the fair, and the impartial way in which he conducted the hearings in connection with the Colby nomination. A number of statements had been made regarding Mr. Colby. The Senator from Missouri saw to it that the committee probed all these areas very carefully. The Senator from Missouri went out of his way to run down all statements including rumors, that might bear on the qualifications of Mr. Colby. I commend the Senator, and I say to the Senate that this nomination has been thoroughly examined by the committee.

I want to observe that William Colby is an outstanding and able professional in the Central Intelligence Agency. I believe that he stands in the best tradition of the professionalism which some of us feel is so essential to the security of the United States of America. I have confidence in Mr. Colby. There were a number of situations—one in particular—in which his integrity was tested. He did not hesitate to be forthright and straightforward in his decision as to what he should do based on his oath and his obligation as a part of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I merely want to say to the Senate that I do believe that this is a good appointment, and I hope and trust that the Senate will give Mr. Colby the overwhelming vote of confidence that he so richly deserves.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank my good friend, the able Senator from Washington, for his kind remarks. For many years it has been well known in this body that he is a true expert in this field. I respect his opinion, as I am sure the Senate does also, on matters of this character. I am grateful for what he said.

Mr. President, I earnestly hope that the Senate confirms the nomination of William E. Colby to be Director of Central Intelligence.

The Committee on Armed Services overwhelmingly approved his nomination. I have known him personally for many years. He is a dedicated and competent professional in a difficult and troublesome field.

Because he is unusually able, Mr. Colby has been asked to take on some difficult responsibilities in recent years.

In 1968 President Johnson asked him to head the pacification program in the increasingly unpopular Vietnam war. More recently, as Executive Director of CIA, he has been assigned certain responsibilities for correlating and organizing information in the wake of the all-infecting Watergate break-in.

I am sure the Senate realizes that recent events—including Watergate and the Indochina war—have caused the Senate Armed Services Committee to give unprecedented attention to this nomination—not only because of the nominee himself, but also because of the importance of the assignment as head of CIA, top intelligence adviser to the President, at this point in history

As far as I can determine, Mr. President, no nominee for this important job has ever been questioned so intensively

by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Three days of testimony were taken by the full committee. In addition, the Central Intelligence Subcommittee questioned Mr. Colby at a fourth meeting.

In addition to these nomination hearings, the committee held 6 days of hearings in May on the CIA relationship to Watergate. Witnesses included former CIA Directors Schlesinger and Helms, the former Deputy Director, General Cushman, and the current Deputy Director, General Walters, and other CIA officials, including Mr. Colby. In all, this year the committee has taken many hours of testimony on this nomination and other CIA matters.

In addition to testifying in extensive hearings, Mr. Colby has provided extensive responses and exhibits in reply to later questions from Senator KENNEDY, who was provided the opportunity of questioning Mr. Colby; and also Senator PROXMIRE, as well as members of the committee, submitted questions.

CIA, NSC, AND THE PRESIDENT

Let me say a preliminary word about the position of CIA with respect to the White House and other executive bodies.

The Senate should be under no illusions about the position of this Agency in the national command authority. By law, CIA is responsible to the National Security Council. However, the NSC is advisory to the President who is the NSC Chairman. As a former NSC member in two different positions, I know well that the National Security Council is one of those bodies where but one vote really counts—that of the President.

In other words, in point of fact the CIA is directly under the President and responsible to him.

MR. COLBY'S PUBLIC TESTIMONY

The record is available to all Senators. Mr. Colby, in his public testimony made some statements which are refreshing, coming as they do from a career official of CIA who has now been designated to be the Director of Central Intelligence.

As example, Mr. Colby stated, in response to a question, that he thought the war in Laos had "undoubtedly gone well beyond the scope of activities envisioned by Congress in 1947, when it authorized CIA to perform certain covert activities, and he questioned the feasibility of such large scale covert activities.

Later, I personally asked Mr. Colby if he would favor a policy of more open disclosure with respect to activities of the intelligence community. Here is his reply:

Mr. COLBY. I think it is probably essential in America today, Mr. Chairman, and I would favor a greater degree of exposure of what we are doing. We have already had some matters which we do expose. Some of the exposure that we have quite frankly gives us problems abroad in our relationships with other intelligence services, and even in our relationships with individuals who secretly agree to work with us, who are somewhat frightened at the prospect of their names coming into the public, and things happening to them as a result. But I think that there are ways in which the intelligence community and the CIA in particular can reassure the appropriate committees, and also the Senate as a whole, and also the people as a whole, as to the activities we are engaged in. I think we are going to have to draw that line. It is going to be a difficult one in many situations, but it is obvious that again we have to run an American intelligence service.

I also asked Mr. Colby about possible amendments to the 1947 law which governs CIA, since our committee is committed to a broad review of the CIA charter. He made it clear that he is not opposed to certain changes. In that connection, he later stated that he has been authorized to brief the committee on the basic directives issued to CIA by the National Security Council—NSCID's—under the 1947 act. This we plan to have him do at the earliest opportunity.

Finally, in his discussions of possible revision of the law, Mr. Colby said he thought it might be appropriate to limit CIA intelligence activities by specific references to "foreign" intelligence. I asked Mr. Colby to state the proper scope of CIA activities within the United States, and he responded as follows:

Mr. COLBY. We obviously have to run a headquarters here; we have to recruit people for our staffs; and so forth; we have to conduct investigations on those people; we have to protect our own intelligence sources and methods within the Agency; we have to contract with a large number of American firms for the various kinds of equipment that we might have need for abroad. We also, I believe quite properly, can collect foreign intelligence in the United States, including the requesting American citizens to share with their Government certain information they may know about foreign situations. We have a service that does this, and I am happy to say, a very large number of American citizens have given us some very important information. We do not pay for that information. We can protect their proprietary interest and even protect their names if necessary, if they would rather not be exposed as the source of that information.

We also, I believe have certain support activities that we must conduct in the United States in order to conduct foreign intelligence operations abroad. Certain structures are necessary in this country to give our people abroad perhaps a reason for operating abroad in some respects so that they can appear not as CIA employees but as representatives of some other entity. Lastly, I think that there are a number of activities in the United States where foreign intelligence can be collected from foreigners, and as long as this is foreign intelligence, I think it quite proper that we do so. I can certainly go into more detail on this in executive session any time you would like, Mr. Chairman. . . .

And may I add that he did.

But I reiterate that the focus should and must be foreign intelligence only, and that all the other activities are only supportive of that major function.

Finally, I asked Mr. Colby what I believe is the most important question of all:

Senator SYMINGTON. If you should receive an order in the future which appears on its face to be illegal, what would you do?

Mr. COLBY. I would object to it and, if necessary, I am quite prepared to leave this responsibility if it came to that.

Senator SYMINGTON. I did not hear you.

Mr. COLBY. And I am quite prepared to leave this job if it comes to that.

THE OUTSIDE WITNESSES

Five outside witnesses testified in public sessions, July 20, on the Colby nomination. One of them, Paul Sakwa, a CIA officer in the 1960's, suggested that we obtain certain documents from CIA which show that Mr. Colby "slanted intelligence" and "submitted misinformation" as CIA station chief in Saigon from 1959 to 1962.

With the help of the CIA we were able to get almost all of the classified cables and reports suggested by Mr. Sakwa. The committee appreciates his interest, but it is fair to say that the committee was not impressed with the thesis which he advanced as it applied to Mr. Colby.

Another witness, Mr. Samuel A. Adams, was, until recently, a CIA analyst. He criticized the Phoenix program—which I shall discuss later—and he also complained of the treatment given him by CIA after he pressed his own appraisal of certain estimates of Communist strength in Cambodia. Mr. Adams did not specifically oppose Mr. Colby's nomination.

The other three witnesses were Representative ROBERT F. DRINAN, Democrat of Massachusetts; K. Barton Osborn, a sergeant assigned to Military Intelligence, who left Vietnam about a month after Mr. Colby took over the pacification program in 1968, and David S. Harrington, a former Marine officer who was assigned to the pacification program, and once, in early 1969, sat in on an I Corps briefing for Mr. Colby.

All these witnesses focused on the period from November 1968 to June 1971, when Mr. Colby headed the Vietnam pacification program as Deputy MACV for Civil Operations and Regional Development Support—CORDS. Each of these witnesses were especially critical of one CORDS program: Phoenix.

PROJECT PHOENIX

The Phoenix program has been covered in a number of congressional hearings—including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senator KENNEDY's Refugee Subcommittee. The program was one of Mr. Colby's responsibilities as the boss of CORDS, the head of the pacification program.

It is important to realize that Phoenix was a Vietnamese program. It had U.S. support, however, in funds and manpower. The program was aimed at the VCI—the Vietcong Infrastructure—members of the Vietcong apparatus who were working against the Government within the cities and hamlets of South Vietnam.

Unquestionably, there were abuses in the program. Mr. Colby has conceded that. He testified, however, that the great preponderence of Vietcong Infrastructure killed—some 85 percent—died in battles and skirmishes, were eventually identified as VCI, and were added to the casualty lists as VCI. Others were killed by police units.

By way of further explanation, Mr. Colby emphasized that despite this being a war, killing was to be minimized in Phoenix especially, because captured VCI were the best source of intelligence to help our own military units.

Mr. Colby told us he worked to provide protection for accused VCI, and bring a measure of due process into these paramilitary proceedings. He testified that Phoenix eventually required three accusers, required that province chiefs be notified of VCI charges; and finally, in

1971, that charges be presented to a suspect in writing.

At our request he has supplied a series of documents, some of them classified Vietnamese documents, to support his claim that reforms were instituted by Phoenix under his leadership.

Mr. President, my opposition to this whole Indochina war since 1967 has been well known to Members of the Senate. But I do not think we should lose the ability of an extraordinarily able man who was only carrying out orders, just because he was in a paramilitary job at the same time we were decorating thousands of Americans for carrying out their military assignments. He accepted a tough job under orders and did his best; and the record shows that he tried to eliminate any abuses he discovered when he took over the Phoenix program.

CONCLUSION

Mr. President, this has been a summary of the extensive record the committee took on this nomination. Much in the record is classified, but we have tried to accommodate Senators who wanted more information.

I believe the record justifies Mr. Colby's confirmation.

He is exceptionally well qualified. The way the world is, surely we need an effective intelligence agency.

It is for these reasons that again let me say I do hope the Senate will confirm him without delay so the intelligence community can get on with its important job.

I yield to the able ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the distinguished senior Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the nomination of Mr. William E. Colby as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The case for Mr. Colby has been well documented by the distinguished acting chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON).

Simply stated this man is a professional in every sense of the word. For the most part he has spent his entire life in public service.

The son of an Army officer, he joined the Army himself in 1941 initially serving in the Parachute Field Artillery. When the Office of Strategic Services issued a call for French speakers in 1943, Mr. Colby volunteered and in 1944 parachuted behind enemy lines in north-central France to work with a resistence unit. Shortly before the end of the war in 1945, he led a team dropped in northern Norway to destroy a rail line used for transporting German reinforcements.

A graduate of Princeton prior to World War II, Mr. Colby completed his formal education by obtaining his law degree from Columbia Law School.

In 1949 he entered Government service as an attorney for the National Labor Relations Board in Washington. In 1951 he joined the staff of the American Embassy in Stockholm and from 1953 to 1958 served in the American Embassy in Rome, Italy.

Mr. President, the purpose of tracing this biography is to show the wide experience of Mr. Colby in foreign assignments. He not only spent time overseas as a youth when his father held overseas assignments but the vast majority of his life has been in U.S. positions abroad.

After serving as first secretary of the American Embassy in Saigon beginning in 1959, Mr. Colby returned to the United States to become Chief of the Far East Division of the CIA here in Washington.

In March of 1968 he joined the Agency for International Development and was sent to Saigon to assume the post of assistant chief of staff. In November of that year he became deputy to the commander of the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam with the rank of an Ambassador. In this capacity he directed the civil operation and regional development support program. This was better known as the pacification or Vietnamization program. As director of this program, Mr. Colby was the administrator for all regional and popular defense forces as well as aid programs in South Vietnam. The success of this program had a great deal to do with the safe withdrawal of American military forces last year.

In early 1972, Mr. Colby returned to Washington to assume the duties of Executive Director-Comptroller of the CIA. In March of 1973, under the directorship of Dr. James Schlesinger, he was named to the No. 3 spot at CIA—that of Deputy Director for Operations.

Mr. President, few men are as well qualified for the post as Director of the CIA as Mr. Colby. He knows the agency well. He has worked for it many years. He has had experience in managing the CIA budget.

As we move into a period of negotiation the intelligence gathered by the CIA will be more important than ever. We need a professional at the helm.

Further, Congress will be taking a greater interest in the activities of the CIA in future years. This is as it should be. With a man of Mr. Colby's qualifications and background in the Director's office, I believe more congressional oversight can be accomplished in an effective and beneficial way.

Mr. President, in closing, I would like to stress the point made by our able chairman that Mr. Colby has had some tough jobs over the years, because he was the very man who could handle them. He has worked under four Presidents. He clearly recognizes the fact that the CIA never involves itself in policy, but merely presents the best information available for policy decisions by the President. He is a man who I believe will render our Nation a distinct service in this unique position and I urge the Senate to act favorably on his nomination.

I wish to thank the distinguished acting chairman.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able senior Senator from South Carolina, ranking minority member of Armed Services, for his constructive contribution.

I yield now to the distinguished senior Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE).

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the distinguished acting chairman of the committee.

A BLIND CONFIRMATION VOTE

Mr. President, today the Senate will cast a blind vote on the confirmation of William E. Colby to be Director of Central Intelligence.

It will be a blind vote in many ways. We do not really know who Mr. Colby is. We are not allowed to go back into his personal employment history and judge his fitness. We do not know what jobs he has accomplished. We do not know whether or not he has succeeded or failed.

And we will be confirming him for a blind position. In my opinion the Director of Central Intelligence is one of the 8 or 10 most powerful positions in our Government.

So we will vote for or against a man in an immensely powerful office and we know very little about him or the job. Why is this?

Obviously, there are serious questions of national security involved. Intelligence operations can be compromised and lives put in danger. There is the ever-present possibility of embarrassing the Nation if caught in the middle of some particularly sensitive operation. Sources of information may dry up.

All these point to the necessity of secrecy.

But I would remind the Senate that failure to find out what is going on could be just as serious from a security standpoint. Do we turn a blind eye to the covert funding of clandestine armies and attempts to overthrow foreign governments?

No, we have lived in blindness too long in this body.

If we do not assert our constitutional responsibilities, the executive department will do it for us. That has been the pattern.

RECENT CHANGES

Today there are promising signs that we are snapping out of the slumber of acquiescence that has typified congressional oversight of the intelligence community.

The Armed Services Committee has held open hearings for the first time. Questions have been submitted for the RECORD and other Senators have been allowed to pursue individual lines of questioning in committee hearings.

The distinguished acting chairman of the committee, Mr. SYMINGTON, deserves our commendation for the skill and openness of these meetings. He has begun the process of reviewing the intelligence community and he deserves the support of every Member.

Last week I submitted a series of questions to the acting chairman for presentation to Mr. Colby during his final confirmation hearing. The Director-designate promptly replied. Most of his answers are unclassified and I wish to share those unclassified answers today.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my questions and Mr. Colby's answers be placed in the RECORD.

I would like to go over several of these questions.

First is the issue of the CIA budget. Since Mr. Colby and his predecessor, Mr.

Schlesinger, both testified that the release of the aggregate intelligence budget would not violate national security, I asked Mr. Colby just how far down the line this prudently could go.

He used this question as a platform to back off from his earlier position. Now he says that although the "disclosure of the total figure of the intelligence community budget would not present a security problem at this time, it is likely to stimulate requests for additional details." He goes on to note that he cannot positively recommend the publication of the total or any subdivision thereof.

Mr. President, I do not think that a new Director of Central Intelligence should be confirmed without public knowledge of the size of his budget.

In view of testimony by Mr. Colby and his predecessor James R. Schlesinger that release of the intelligence budget would not violate national security, there is no doubt that the Senate and the American people should be told the truth about the size of the CIA budget.

Mr. Colby has said that it is up to Congress to release these facts. Now is the time to do just that.

Mr. President, I would like to ask the distinguished manager of the nomination, the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), if he could consider releasing those figures in view of the fact that the testimony from both Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Colby is that it would not violate national security. Why should not the Senate and the American people know as much as we can disclose about this matter as long as national security is not endangered and why should we not have that information?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, first may I say to the able Senator his statement this afternoon is in the interest of the security and the prosperity of our country. I commend him for it. It is the same type and character of interest he has displayed in other matters that are for the welfare of the United States.

When the question of the budget of the Central Intelligency Agency came up, inasmuch as I was a member of both Armed Services and Foreign Relations I found the latter committee was reaching dicisions not in accordance with the facts presented by the Central Intelligence Agency. I then urged that the Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee include members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, which at that time included only the top ranking members of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee. For some reason, the late, great Senator Russell decided later to exclude the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, this after they were members by invitation for several years.

Then it is fair to say that most CIA interest and the budget still later came before the Appropriations Committee only, the five or seven senior members of the Appropriations Committee.

I believe that it was 2 years ago that our late beloved colleague, Senator Ellender, was asked on the floor of the Senate about this budget, and replied to the effect that he did not know much about it, and did not want to know. He was chairman of the one committee exercising any review of the status and functioning of the CIA.

This year the Senate Armed Services Committee took Mr. Colby and other members of the Central Intelligence Agency through the budget in detail. Questions were asked and explanations given.

As acting chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I would welcome the opportunity of going over that budget with the distinguished senior Senator from Wisconsin, who is a member of the Committee on Appropriations. From there on, I would rather not commit myself further at this time as to just what can and should be done.

I may say, of interest to other Senators as well as to the Senator from Wisconsin, that the Central Intelligence Agency receives a relatively small percentage of the overall intelligence dollar. That was a great surprise to me when I first found it out.

I may say also that several staff members of the Committee on Foreign Relations sent around the world by Subcommittee on U.S. Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported when they returned that probably the most wasteful, duplicating aspect of what they saw on their trip was in the intelligence field. We are trying to release more intelligence figures. I am sure the able Senator could obtain them as a member of the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I may say to the Senator from Missouri that I am interested in obtaining those intelligence figures, as he knows, but the important step is to declassify them. We have the word of Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Colby that this would not affect national security if we knew how much it is. Mr. Colby said it is up to Congress to release those figures. Under the circumstances, I see no reason why we should not be able to get this information. The Senator said it is a small part of the total intelligence dollar. Is it a billion dollars? A half billion? How much is it? I think the attitude we have toward CIA, to some extent, has to be influenced by what resources we put into it. This can best be determined by knowing what the dollar spending is on the CIA.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, on July 2, in an open hearing, I made this observation and asked Mr. Colby:

> Several Members of Congress have called for the overall budget of the intelligence community to be made public, so the American people can see at least the general amount which is spent for intelligence functions. In past years, and despite the increasing desire of the American people to know what is going on in their Government, the furnishing of intelligence information has been further restricted.
>
> Do you see any reason why overall budget information, or even a breakdown of the intelligence budget into its major categories, would endanger national security if it were made public?

Mr. Colby replied:

> I would propose to leave that question, Mr. Chairman, in the hands of the Congress to decide. I think there are considerations pro and con on all sides of that question. But I have found that the Congress is at least as responsible on this as our friends elsewhere in Government, and we have, as you know, shared with the Congress some very sensitive material which has been successfully protected by the Congress.
>
> On the other hand, there are situations in which an American intelligence service will have to be much more exposed than the intelligence services of other countries. We are not going to run the kind of intelligence service that other countries run. We are going to run one in the American society and the American constitutional structure, and I can see that there may be a requirement to expose to the American people a great deal more than might be convenient from the narrow intelligence point of view.

That appeared a constructive answer. Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and I would hope the Appropriations Committee will do their best to release more information about this budget. I do not think his answer means, however, an unqualified endorsement that everyone in America ought to know the details of the intelligence business. That would be against the Nation's interest.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I think that is correct; but I do not understand why we cannot be told the total amount, so that we will have some basis for judging it.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Let me say to the able Senator, we would also give the total amount for the DIA, for the NSA, and the amounts for the various other intelligence services, including the Office of Naval Intelligence and the other services; and I would be glad to discuss this with the able Senator, or anyone else. I read that into the RECORD, because I did not think Mr. Colby's answer to the question was quite as broad as I was led to believe by what the able Senator said.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Can the Senator give any reason for not disclosing the overall amount?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes, but I would rather not discuss this on the floor, rather some other place at the convenience of the Senator from Wisconsin. There ought to be more public information. How it is given out, from the standpoint of national security, I would prefer to discuss further with the able Senator from Wisconsin at his convenience.

Then I would be glad to abide by his decision, because knowing him, I would either persuade him I was right, or he would me that he was right.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Just one further point on this. My resistance to handling this on a classified and confidential basis is that there is then no way in which it can be used in debate. There is no way in which it can be used in a report to other Senators. There is no way in which it can be made something on which we can secure outside expert opinion and judgments either as to the adequacy of the responses or how much should be put in.

Frankly, some of the most thoughtful and useful comments on spending policy comes from outside Congress. It comes from a variety of people; it comes from the interested experts in the universities, the business community, and elsewhere; and if we cannot discuss this publicly, so we can secure that opinion it seems to me we are very sharply handicapped.

I think the Senator will agree that the success of the operations of the CIA, at least in the covert field, have been mixed—in fact, mixed on the side of being a whole series of pretty disastrous failures, and I think one of the reasons is because so much of it has been done in secret.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I fully agree with the Senator.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I have just alluded to the fact that CIA operations have often failed. Let me run through very quickly some of the CIA operations that have been made public, and how they have operated:

1953: Overthrow of Premier Mossadegh and retention of Shah on throne in Iran. I think we can agree that one was successful.

Early 1950's: Attempted airdrop of men into Albania to overthrow Albanian Government. Ended in disaster—all caught.

1954: President Arbenz of Guatemala and his Communist cabinet overthrown by CIA team. That was a success.

1958: CIA support for invasion forces against President Sukarno of Indonesia. U.S. pilot, Allan Pope, captured later released by intervention of Robert Kennedy. That was interpreted by most at that time as a failure.

1960: Reported bribe of Singapore Premier of $1 million. Another failure.

1960: U.S. U–2 pilot Francis Gary Powers shot down over U.S.S.R. Collapse of summit meeting. That was certainly a failure.

1961: Bay of Pigs. We all know what a failure that was.

1958–62: Support for Khamba tribesmen of Tibet against Chinese invasion. Training camp established at Camp Hale in Colorado. Tibet operation terminated with some loss of life among trained Tibetans. A failure.

1964–66: CIA involvement with emigree groups exposed in court case over United States and Canadian Estonian organizations. A failure.

1964: CIA supported U.S. Congo operation by assisting Tshombe. Anti-Castro Cubans used to fly U.S. aircraft. I think that was considered by most to be a mistake.

1964–65: CIA attempts to rig Chilean elections against Allende. Frei wins with CIA support. A temporary but certainly a pyrrhic victory, which has resulted since then in the view of many, as hurtful to American policy.

1966–67: National Student Association found funded by CIA. Elaborate front organizations in the United States exposed. That was certainly considered to be a failure.

Training and support of secret army in Laos at cost of over $300 million a year. I think that would be a failure.

Supply of red wig, miniature camera, credentials, and voice alternative device to E. Howard Hunt given by CIA. That would certainly be considered a disaster.

Operation of dummy and front organizations such as Air America and Southern Air Transport. Certainly doubtful.

Phoenix program to neutralize Vietcong infrastructure—20,587 people killed during Phoenix program led by William E. Colby. That certainly had mixed result at best, in the view, of most observers, on the basis of the hindsight we now have.

So, as I say, this is not an agency that has a long and distinguished record of achievement in the covert operations. They have done many useful things in intelligence gathering; we would have to acknowledge that. But the country would have been better served and the CIA would have done a better job if we could have had more congressional knowledge of these covert operations, and if in fact some of them, at least, had been made public at a time when they could have been discussed, and then influenced the policies that were formulated later.

I am not contending that all covert operations can be made public in advance, of course.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The covert operations that have failed are the ones made public. Some covert operations that have cost many American lives have been outstandingly successful. Some such operations have cost the lives of friends in foreign countries, although outstandingly successful.

I believe it unfortunate and illegal that the CIA was instructed by the National Security Council, just another way of saying the President of the United States, to carry on a war in Laos. I do not believe that will happen again. Although the Director of the CIA does not report to Congress, he promised me he will do his best to see it does not happen again. He knows the damage that war has done to the good name of the Agency he has served loyally for many years.

I agree with the Senator from Wisconsin that many problems we are talking about today came about, because of lack of review on the part of the committees of Congress that should have been more interested in CIA operations.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I think we also ought to recognize that it is very possible that this whole notion of our playing God, of our determining that the head of a government in a foreign country is not the right one, that we should challenge whether to act by assassination or by military coup or in some other way to put our own national preferences in authority and power. The President for whom both of us have such reverence, Harry Truman, who was the man during whose administration the CIA was founded, said in 1963 that he had no idea, at the time the CIA was established, that it would get into covert operations. He was appalled at the so-called "dirty tricks" record.

So here is one area that, whatever we are spending—and we have no idea—considerable question could be raised, first, as to whether we should continue, in view of the fact that we can challenge whether it is serving our interests under any circumstances; second, whether covert operations represent a moral attitude and posture that we should take; and third, whether this kind of activity should be continued without the congressional oversight, congressional knowledge, and congressional decision that should be required.

Mr. SYMINGTON. May I say the great President the able Senator just mentioned brought me into Government; and The first Director of the Central Intelligence Agency was from my home town, and a close friend. I agree the agency began doing extraordinary things in later years, actions not justified under its charter. Let us hope that can be corrected. I would hope to see legislation, plan to suggest some myself, to correct this development. On the other hand, of all Senators who might be interested in it, I would say would be the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) because I have never seen, with one exception, a CIA estimate of the Army, Navy, or Air Force capabilities of the possible enemy that was not less than the estimate of our own Armed Services. Without the CIA, we would be turning over decision as to what the enemy has to the Pentagon.

If we do that, I am sure it would increase even more our already very large military budget, because we build our own defenses against the best estimate of what the possible enemy has.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I would agree wholeheartedly, from what I have heard—and I know very little about it, as all of us know very little about it, unfortunately—the CIA may well have done a very good job in bringing quality to the intelligence community in the noncovert intelligence gathering area.

Mr. SYMINGTON. And separated from the military.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Missouri yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield to my able friend from California.

Mr. CRANSTON. I want to express my appreciation for the great work the Senator from Wisconsin has been doing in seeking to bring to public light—for the information of the Senate, the Congress, and the country—the total budget figure for the CIA. It is very important that that figure be made public. I think that the response the Senator got to his question submitted to Mr. Colby during the confirmation hearings indicates clearly that there is no security reason for keeping the figure secret. All that Mr. Colby said, according to the Senator's speech today, was that to disclose the total figure of the intelligence budget would not present a security problem at this time, but that disclosure was likely to stimulate requests for additional details. What he was saying there is that there are no security reasons, but they want to keep the figure secret because they want to keep some other things secret. To me, that makes no sense. If there are figures that should be kept secret, those figures need not be revealed. I agree that there are facts about the CIA's operation that are not properly available for public consumption, but making public the overall figure has nothing to do with concealing those facts.

But the chairman of the committee mentioned that if this figure was made public, then certain overall figures would have to be made public.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I am in a rather extraordinary position this afternoon. Perhaps more than any other Member of the Senate, over a period of years, I have been pleading, arguing, working for further information about the CIA to be released at least to the Congress if not the American people.

So I do not want to be in any box about what is or is not released.

What I said to the able Senator from Wisconsin was based on his being a member of the Appropriations Committee.

So far as I am concerned, it has been most unfortunate the way intelligence information has been so extensively masked in the overall budget.

Mr. CRANSTON. I am delighted that the Senator has made that statement, because that is what the Senator from Wisconsin and I have been looking for. The DIA figure is already in the public domain.

I would like to add to the point the Senator from Missouri made about the figures in the defense budget. Since we do not know what the overall figure for the CIA is, every other figure in the Defense budget is open to suspicion as to its accuracy. In order to conceal within the Defense budget the overall CIA figure, every other figure is susceptible to being padded, and certain figures are padded. As a result, we have no idea what the figures really are, whether for the C–5A, the B–1 bomber, the Trident, or for military housing. We do not know whether those figures are accurate or inaccurate.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from California mentioned the DIA figure as published. I am not sure all the DIA figures are published, or NSA, or ONI, or Army Intelligence, or Air Force Intelligence. We are getting into something that should be checked from the standpoint of national security. I am sure the Senator would agree.

Mr. CRANSTON. Absolutely. I am delighted that we seem to have come to a point of agreement among the three Senators in talking about this matter.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, apropos of what the Senator from Missouri has been quoting, indicating in his judgment that the total size of the intelligence budget is in the neighborhood of something like $5 billion or $6 billion, it has been said by some that this is high, and by others that it is low. Does the Senator feel, or could he discuss the total amount of the intelligence budget, in view of the fact that the Senator from Missouri just said that this is one area where there is more waste and extravagance than in almost any?

Mr. Symington. May I say to the able Senator from Wisconsin that I came in here to recommend the confirmation of Mr. Colby——

Mr. PROXMIRE. All right.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I know the Senator's tremendous capacity for figures—therefore do not want to commit myself because I am not sure. I am quite confident in my own mind, however that the figure of $6 billion is high. As to what the exact figure is, let me check it, and I will tell the Senator before the end of the week as well as the relatively low percentage of that figure that goes to the CIA.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator very much.

Mr. CRANSTON. If the Senator will yield for just one brief question, I should like to ask him if I could also be advised of that figure. The Senator said the Senator from Wisconsin is a member of the Appropriations Committee. I am not contesting my right to the figure——

Mr. SYMINGTON. I would certainly desire to give the Senator from California any information he wants. He has me in a bit of a "crack"——

Mr. CRANSTON. That was deliberate.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Unusual for him, too. Let us see. In any case, one or two members of a committee should not be told about things other members of the committee are not told about. When that happens—and it has happened—I see the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES) in the Chamber, and he knows what I am talking about—then we do not have a majority of the committee voting money on the basis of the facts. It was easy for me to say to the Senator from Wisconsin that I would be glad to discuss it with him, because he is a member of the Appropriations Committee.

Would the Senator be good enough to give me 24 hours, then I will answer his question.

Mr. CRANSTON. Certainly. The difficulty I have in voting on matters like this, not only in relation to the CIA, is that the concealment of the CIA figure distorts every other figure.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from California is right. I am sympathetic. But we do not want to be attacked for violating any rules on national security. I would hope we can do what the Senator from California desires and I appreciate his understanding.

Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator from Missouri very much. I will be delighted to wait until tomorrow.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Jerry Tinker and Dale deHaan be given the privilege of the floor during the course of this debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOMENICI). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The time of the Senator from Wisconsin has expired.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes of time under my control to the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) to finish his statement. He has obviously been in discussion here and has been unable to finish it. So I will be more than happy to yield him that time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I want to thank the distinguished Senator from Iowa for giving me this 15 minutes. I do not think I will use it all.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I participated in this colloquy, but did not start it. If the Senator needs more time I will be glad to yield him from my time.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator. On the issue of the National Security Council Intelligence Directives, which I first raised here on April 10 and again on June 4, I am pleased to note that for the first time the oversight committees will be briefed on their contents. It is simply unbelievable that the oversight committees were unaware of these—the primary operating directions to the intelligence community—for all these years. How could there be any oversight if Congress had no idea about what the executive department had directed the CIA to do? That is why the oversight committees did not know about the secret army in Laos or the tampering with the election in Chile. They did not even know where to look.

I urge the oversight committees to retain copies of these directives and require frequent briefings along the lines of the programs undertaken under each directive.

I ask the distinguished Senator from Missouri, the acting chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, if it would be possible to sanitize the NSCID's and release them publicly or have the National Security Council do so—that is, take out the classified information included in them, but release what can be released.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am not sure, but have obtained approval to look at them myself. We have been so busy trying to get the procurement bill out under pressure from the leadership that I just have not yet had time. I would be glad to ascertain whether or not that would be possible. Those directives from the National Security Council, at least in the minds of some people, in effect go against the legislation which created the agency itself.

Mr. PROXMIRE. It is the kind of information we ought to have. Much of it is historical and dated and therefore could be disclosed.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I agree. The only person who could decide that would be the President or his agent, through the National Security Council. I will be glad to write them a letter about it.

Mr. PROXMIRE. When I get classified information and I ask that it be sanitized, 90 or 95 percent of the information is usually intact.

I might also add at this point that the CIA's reply to my question about the interpretation and extension of the National Security Act of 1947 was completely inadequate. The NSCID's flow from one clause in the 1947 act. The act also provides, as Mr. Colby states, that the National Security Council shall issue directives pursuant to the act.

But this does not give the National Security Council the right to change the intent or substance of the original act. It merely enables the National Security Council to carry out the expressed wishes of Congress as stated in the act. And nowhere in the act does Congress give the CIA authority to operate overseas with covert techniques.

In 1963, President Truman stated emphatically that he did not have this in mind when the CIA was formed during his administration.

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Finally, I wish to talk about the issue of domestic operations. Although Congress clearly did not want the CIA to become involved in domestic matters and

placed specific language in the act to that effect, still the CIA maintains certain domestic operations. Some of these may be harmless, like the Domestic Contact Service, but others pose more serious problems.

Mr. President, the strictest kind of restraint must be placed on domestic activities of the intelligence community. The CIA has no place training police forces under the omnibus crime bill. It should not be forming dummy domestic corporations or active corporations, for that matter. CIA ties with the academic community, research institutes, aerospace companies, and Federal bureaucracies should be carefully controlled.

I am particularly disturbed that the Domestic Contact Service has been placed under the operational control of the clandestine services. Mr. Colby says that this is to improve the coordination of its collection activities with those of the Agency abroad. I find this disturbing because of the possibility that the DCS, which has a good reputation, may now become 'tainted" by the covert side of the Agency. If the DCS is an open and aboveboard operation, then it s hould operate in an open and aboveboard manner. It should operate under the authority of the analytical side of the CIA.

I should like to ask the Senator from Missouri one other question: Does the chairman think the oversight committees should be told about the foreign and domestic operations?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I would put it this way: The oversight committees should be told everything that does not directly affect an operation.

During the years I spent in the Pentagon at the Secretary level, there was one subject I did not want to know about; namely, the details of war plans.

If we have agents in a foreign country, under cover, I do not want to know who they are, nor do I want to know the details of their actions.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I understand that. I think everyone would agree with that. What I have in mind is that when these operations have taken place, and without disclosing identities of individuals involved, does the Senator feel that the oversight committees should be informed, so that there could be a prompt evaluation and a policy determined on the basis of that experience?

Mr. SYMINGTON. One of the most unfortunate developments in the history of this country was the secret war in Laos run by the CIA out of the Embassy in Vientiane under instructions from the Embassy. It was run without knowledge on the part of members of the Armed Services Committee or the CIA Oversight Committee or the Committee on Foreign Relations.

It was only found out about when staff members of Foreign Relations went into Laos and found a war being run out of the Embassy in Vientiane.

That kind of secret operation is wrong. It all should have been reported to the proper committees. I believe the main reason it was not reported was because they knew if it was found out, it would have been stopped.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Are these foreign operations ever reported to the oversight committees?

Mr. SYMINGTON. They have not for some years.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Why should they not be reported to the oversight committees?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I think they should.

Mr. PROXMIRE. And they should exercise their authority.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. PROXMIRE. So far as the Senator is concerned, that is his position?

Mr. SYMINGTON. And to the best of my ability, I will see that such reporting of a war, a secret CIA war, is put into effect.

THE COLBY CONFIRMATION

Mr. PROXMIRE. In considering how to vote on the Colby confirmation I have weighed the available facts, as inadequate as they may be. On the negative side are his associations with the Phoenix program, his lifelong career in the covert side of intelligence, and the whole question of executive department use of the CIA. On the positive side is his willingness to answer all questions, his reputation as a good administrator, and some awareness of the propriety of close congressional oversight.

On balance, I have decided to support Mr. Colby. But I am giving notice that I will closely monitor his leadership of the intelligence community. And I will not hesitate to object to any questionable use of the intelligence community in domestic affairs. Furthermore, I may offer certain amendments to the military procurement bill dealing with the CIA.

A NEW OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE

Mr. President, within the next few days I will introduce a resolution to create a standing committee of the Senate on the Central Intelligence Agency. There are many sound reasons for creating a full standing committee. Not the least of these is the need for continuing oversight of the multibillion-dollar intelligence community. This can only be done with a full-time staff unencumbered by other responsibilities.

I will recommend that this new committee be composed of members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, and others selected from the remaining Senators.

Mr. President, I welcome the statement by the distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (Mr. STENNIS) that the committee will undertake a reassessment of its oversight responsibilities. I hope that my bill S. 1935 will be considered at that time.

I thank the distinguished Senator from Iowa and the distinguished Senator from Missouri for yielding me time.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time to the Senator from Iowa, and I thank the Senator once again.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from Iowa will yield, I am very glad to hear the able Senator from Wisconsin say he has decided to vote for Mr. Colby. Knowing him as I do, I know also that he would so do unless he felt it was right and in the interest of the country.

His speech today on the Senate floor is constructive. This situation has been wrong; it has been wrong over a period of years; it should be corrected; and as a member of the Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, and a member of the Military Subcommittee on Appropriations, I will be glad to work with him to that end.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I yield myself 15 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES) and the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) have at least 20 minutes apiece of the remaining time and that the vote occur on the pending nomination at the hour of 4 p.m.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I do wish to speak on the nomination and I am not certain as to the time I will need. I am waiting to hear the statements of the two Senators.

Mr. MANSFIELD. We are trying to accommodate several Senators who would like to vote at 4 o'clock.

Mr. CRANSTON. I do not want to object, but I would like to have 12 or 14 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Very well. I withdraw the request.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I have requested time to speak to clarify my opposition to this nomination. As I stated at the time of the vote by the Armed Services Committee, I wanted to review the evidence which had been presented before making a final judgment.

That review has reinforced my original inclination to oppose Mr. Colby's nomination.

At the outset, let me say that I do not question Mr. Colby's ability. He has an impressive background of Government service in intelligence and other areas as well as good academic and professional credentials.

Moreover, I am pleased with many of the statements and pledges made by Mr. Colby in his confirmation hearings.

He has offered to accede to Congress will in making public some information about the CIA budget.

He has promised to continue reducing unnecessary intelligence activities in order to hold down costs.

He has stated that he would respect the prohibitions on CIA activities within the United States and calls the Agency's assistance to E. Howard Hunt a mistake that will not be made again.

He has agreed to consider providing written materials as well as oral briefings to the appropriate congressional committees.

And he has declared his intention to resign if he is ever given an order to involve the Agency in an illegal act.

These are no small assurances and he is to be commended for them.

Despite those statements, Mr. President, I remain troubled about Mr. Colby's suitability for this particular important and sensitive position. After all, we are deciding who shall control what our intelligence agency does overseas and who should be the President's chief analyst of political and military developments in other countries that affect our national interest and security.

The decision as to who should have these far-reaching powers gets to basic consideration of a public official's loyalty to the Constitution of the United States when that loyalty seems contravened by other loyalties and disciplines. This, in turn, gets at the fundamental qualification for a CIA Director of an overriding commitment to civilian control of the Agency.

At a time when startling disclosures are being made of secret warfare being waged at the behest of a few individuals in command positions and of large scale falsification of official reports on such activities to the Congress and the American people, it seems imperative to me that we take a thorough, objective look at the temperament and background of the individual we select for this powerful, sensitive post.

In this context, I have serious doubts about the way in which Mr. Colby handled his previous assignments.

His optimistic assessments of the popularity and strength of President Diem in South Vietnam a dozen years ago may well have helped to cement American policy in support of a dictator who had lost touch with his own people. Better judgments in those years may well have avoided or mitigated the tragedy of Vietnam.

Mr. Colby's activities as head of the Far East Division of the Directorate of Plans may well have undermined the 1962 Laos accords and led to the start of the secret but deadly war in that troubled country.

Mr. Colby's direction of the Phoenix program, however well intentioned it may have been, clearly did not prevent abuses and excesses in that program which are now a matter of public record. I will leave to some of my colleagues a more detailed analysis of Mr. Colby's record as director of Phoenix which I believe requires the most careful scrutiny.

I am also frankly troubled about some of the attitudes Mr. Colby has shown toward the proper role of the CIA in the future.

Take, for example, his statements with regard to U.S. activities in Laos.

Mr. Colby told the distinguished acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee (Mr. SYMINGTON) that—

> The initiation of CIA's activity in Laos was a matter which did require the use of intelligence techniques because it was felt important at that time that the United States not be officially involved in that activity.

Regardless of whatever "intelligence techniques" were involved, the fact was that the CIA financed one military faction which overthrew the legitimate Government of Laos in 1960 and later sponsored a secret army responsive to American rather than Laotian policies. As the years passed, Americans became so deeply involved with this army—through advisers, pay, and air support—that the CIA was in effect running its own war in Laos rather than simply gathering intelligence.

Mr. Colby never told the committee that he would not engage in another secret, CIA-run war. Rather, he said:

> I will try to keep it out of the kind of exposure that some of these larger activities got us into.

His concern was with exposure rather than with impropriety or outright illegality of an intelligence-gathering agency's running a war.

In a written question for Mr. Colby, I tried to pin down this crucial difference. I asked him: Where should the line be drawn between CIA and Defense Department activities involving the use of armed force?

His answer was:

> In general, the line should be drawn between CIA and the Defense Department with respect to armed force at the point in which the United States acknowledges involvement in such activities. As a practical matter, however, the scale of the activity will, in many cases, also affect whether the United States is revealed as engaged in the activity.

Again, the point to be made is that Mr. Colby believes that CIA-run military operations are perfectly acceptable so long as they can be concealed. This is unacceptable to me.

When Americans are involved in combat, the Congress should be informed and congressional approval should be obtained.

Yet Mr. Colby stopped short of promising the openness which our system demands. When I asked him: Do you believe that it is proper under our Constitution for such military operations—as in Laos—to be conducted without the knowledge or approval of Congress, he replied:

> The appropriate committees of the Congress and a number of individual senators and congressmen were briefed on CIA's activities in Laos during the period covered. In addition, CIA's programs were described to the Appropriations Committees in our annual budget hearings.

Mr. President, in my judgment, the lines drawn by Mr. Colby in responding to these questions are too blurry to be acceptable.

Given the recent evidence of the failure of more than a handful of Members of Congress—if that many—to be informed of the secret B–52 raids in Cambodia, I am suspicious of such assertions. And I am sure that the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), though we differ on this particular nomination, would agree that sufficient and timely information on Laos was not provided to the Congress.

Now we face the problem of Cambodia. Press reports suggest that the CIA has already placed personnel throughout the country who are providing radio equipment to Cambodian units and who then suggest where these units should operate. At least some of these people worked on paramilitary operations in Laos at an earlier time.

We have to be sure that these people are not the entering wedge of another clandestine cadre of American military advisers—which would be contrary to existing law and against the clear desire of the American people and the Congress to withdraw from military operations in Cambodia.

Mr. Colby's prior association with such operations and his testimony make me fear that he might acquiesce in another secret war, at least so long as it can be kept secret.

I have no objection to an intelligence man as director of the CIA. In some cases, it might be positively beneficial, since he would be better able to control the vast bureaucracy beneath him because he knows the ins and outs of the process.

But the intelligence apparatus should be under command and control of proper constitutional authority; its operation must not be permitted to become an end in itself.

I am fearful of a man whose experience has been so largely devoted to clandestine operations involving the use of force and the manipulation of factions in foreign governments. Such a man may become so enamored with these techniques that he loses sight of the higher purposes and moral constraints which should guide our country's activities abroad.

We need as Director of the CIA a man who will unflinchingly act on those purposes and subject to those constraints, a man who will unfailingly show the independence necessary to resist pressures from his operatives below and from his superiors above to try some dirty trick which promises some clever success at the expense of our principles.

Take the example of CIA involvement in domestic activities in the United States. We know that the CIA provided assistance to Howard Hunt's burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office; that it prepared a personality study of Dr. Ellsberg, an American citizen; that it provided probably illegal training to local police forces in our country.

When questioned about taking firm steps to prevent recurrences, Mr. Colby answered me that—

> With respect to the training of local police personnel—any further such action will be taken only in the most exceptional circumstances and with the Director's personal approval.

Instead of outright repudiation of such practices, Mr. Colby left open the door for his own personal decision.

Bluntly, there were too many qualifications, too many hedges in such answers to convince me of Mr. Colby's suitability for this particular command post.

We cannot accept such loopholes unless we are willing to tolerate abuses and, ultimately, risk loss of control.

Mr. President, in confirming a director of the far-flung CIA, there should be no questions whatever in our minds as to his responsiveness to civilian control and his respect for the basic political processes of this republic.

The discipline of the secret operative is necessary, often admirable, but it is not necessarily conducive of the kind

of perspective and judgment required for the head of a vast governmental agency which has the capability of either protecting or compromising our national interest and our moral purpose as a people.

Mr. President, we must recognize today more clearly than ever before that the Congress has awesome responsibilities in voting on this immensely important appointment. The selection of head of the CIA is too crucial to our future to be made with a routine stamp of approval.

This brings us to the larger context of congressional responsibility for oversight of the CIA. In the last 20 years more than 200 bills designed to make the CIA more accountable to Congress have been introduced and have gone absolutely nowhere. The least we can at this time do is to review and live up to our responsibilities under the existing imprecise laws governing that agency.

Mr. President, my opposition to Mr. Colby has no personal overtones. Nor do I have cause to question either his loyalty or ability. The question is whether or not this man in the light of his background and attitudes is qualified for the CIA directorship with all of its sensitive bearing on national security, national purpose, and constitutional liberties.

For me the answer is No.

I yield the floor.

Mr. KENNEDY obtained the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I would like to repeat my request: Twenty minutes to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY), and 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), and then a vote on the nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, reserving the right to object and I shall not object—I simply did not hear the request.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Twenty minutes and 10 minutes and then the vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I, first of all, want to express my very sincere appreciation to the acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and the person that is bringing the nomination to the floor of the U.S. Senate (Mr. SYMINGTON). I want to express my very deep sense of appreciation for all the courtesies he has extended to a Member of the Senate, which in this case is myself, and for cooperating in every possible way to assist this Member to gain information from the nominee and also from the committee itself on a number of different matters which I was deeply troubled by and very much concerned about.

After listening to the colloquy of the Senator from Wisconsin, the Senator from California, and the Senator from Missouri, and hearing the Senator from Missouri indicate that he was going to respond in every positive way he could to work with Members of the Senate, I would like to say publicly that, as a person who has worked with him closely on this particular matter, as well as other matters, I think my colleagues can be very much assured of his cooperation and willingness to extend every degree of information that he possibly can to the Members of the Senate.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I cannot let those very kind remarks go without expressing my gratitude. Having served for many years with the able Senator from Massachusetts, and having had increasing respect for his ability and his intelligence on these and other matters, it was a privilege to cooperate with him in this case. It will always be a privilege to cooperate with him.

Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, although I respect Mr. William Colby's proven ability and the high regard in which he is held by the intelligence community of the United States, I intend to cast my vote against his confirmation as Director of Central Intelligence.

In part, the reservations I have about his nomination are matters of personal conscience, arising out of Mr. Colby's close relationship with the Phoenix program in South Vietnam and my own longstanding humanitarian concern about the effects of the war on Vietnamese civilians.

In part, my reservations also involve larger questions about the changing role of the CIA in American policy and the philosophy of the person the country should have to guide the Agency in the years ahead.

As chairman of the Senate Refugee Subcommittee, as a Senator concerned about civilians in Vietnam, as one who has been to Vietnam and seen their plight firsthand. I have long been troubled by the continuing serious allegations surrounding the Phoenix program.

From the fall of 1968 through the spring of 1971, Mr. Colby was in charge of the U.S. pacification program in South Vietnam. As such, he was one of the principal architects and masterminds of Phoenix, a program designed to "neutralize"—in one of the more notorious euphemisms of the Vietnam war—the so-called Vietcong infrastructure, that is, South Vietnamese civilians providing assistance to the Vietcong.

The following statistics on Phoenix, furnished by Mr. Colby in House hearings in 1971, represent one of the few accepted measures of the program:

PHOENIX—NEUTRALIZATION OF VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE

	Captured	Rallied	Killed	Percent killed	Total neutralized
1968	11,288	2,229	2,559	16	15,766
1969	8,515	4,832	6,187	31	19,534
Sentenced:					
1970	6,405	7,745	8,191	36	22,341
1971 (May)	2,770	2,911	3,650	39	9,331
Total	28,978	17,717	20,587	30	66,972

As Ambassador Colby stated in his public confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 2, during his tenure as head of pacification:

Most of the developments of the Phoenix program were my own.

Yet, the record of Phoenix and related public safety programs under Mr. Colby is marked not only by a shocking dearth of information on the operations and results of the programs—but it is also riddled with unanswered charges and allegations of assassinations, of indiscriminate killing of civilians, of targeting suspects without adequate intelligence, of false arrests and unknown persons "neutralized," of torture and brutality in the interrogation centers and prisons, of jailing non-Communist political opponents of President Thieu, of reclassifying political prisoners as common criminals, and of inexcusably poor training and field control of a program of such lethal scope. And we see the results of this program continuing today in the prisons of South Vietnam.

In addition to a private conversation with Mr. Colby earlier this month, I had the opportunity, at the invitation of the Armed Services Committee to question Mr. Colby last week in executive session, and to submit a series of written questions on Phoenix and related programs. Mr. Colby's replies still leave many questions unanswered—and, in fact, raise some troubling new ones.

In terms of the past record, Mr. Colby has provided no additional information on the Phoenix and related programs, and declined to submit documentation in support of his views.

In terms of the present, it is clear from Mr. Colby's replies that the United States has not fully disengaged from Phoenix and related functions, and that Mr. Colby supports our present posture.

One of the questions I submitted read as follows:

What is the current status of the Phoenix (Phung Hoang) Program? Assuming it continues, does the United States have a supportive, advisory or any other kind of role? Are any American or American sponsored personnel, from the CIA or elsewhere, involved in any way? Are any American commodities or funds, directly or indirectly, from the CIA or elsewhere, supporting any aspect of the Phoenix Program?

This is Mr. Colby's response:

Aside from a GVN national level coordinating committee, the Phung Hoang program has been incorporated within the national police of Vietnam and is no longer a separate program. The United States does not have a support, advisory or other role with respect to the Phung Hoang program, although CIA maintains liaison and assists the Special Police Branch of the National Police in its intelligence functions. The United States advisory effort with the Phung Hoang program was terminated in December 1972, and U.S. assistance to the Phung Hoang program through the Department of Defense ended at the same time. Aside from this relationship with CIA, I am not informed about the uses made of other assistance which might be supplied by the United States.

This comment is distressing. Clearly a continuing American involvement along the lines suggested by Mr. Colby is not only unconscionable—but, I feel, it is also in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the ceasefire agreement for Vietnam.

Finally, in terms of the future and his potential direction of the CIA, Mr. Colby clearly feels that Phoenix-type functions,

organizations and programs that he calls "internal counter-subversive or counter-terrorist activities"—are a proper function of the CIA, and serve a useful purpose in U.S. foreign policy.

Again, one of the questions I submitted read as follows:

Are there plans, anticipations, or personal convictions on your part, that Phoenix programs should be supported by the United States in the Philippines or Thailand or elsewhere?

This was Mr. Colby's response:

Under the Nixon doctrine I do not envisage a large-scale U.S. involvement in internal counter-subversive or counter-terrorist activities on the scale of experience in Vietnam.

Frankly, this is a surprising reply—for the Nixon doctrine has been in force for the greater share of Phoenix history.

As a matter of fact, this morning, in our Refugee Subcommittee, we inquired into the matter with AID and Department of Defense officials. I asked Mr. Dennis Doolin about the Department of Defense's contribution of nearly $12 million, under fiscal year 1974, for police support activities. Under Mr. Colby's earlier response, he recognizes that the Phoenix program continues in Vietnam and recognizes that the program is now incorporated into the national police. However, he was unable to give us any information. We know that we are contributing in excess of $12 million to the police forces of South Vietnam, out of AID and DOD funds. But the Defense Department personnel whom we had before our committee were unable to give any assurance to us this morning that no part of these funds are being used for Phoenix functions.

Also, Mr. Colby indicated when I asked if such a program could start in the Philippines, Thailand, or elsewhere: "Under the Nixon doctrine, I do not envision a large-scale U.S. involvement in internal countersubversive or counter-terrorist activities on the scale of ex-experience in Vietnam."

The Vietnam experience is the one that gave us Phoenix. I cannot say that I was assured by his answers to those questions.

Finally, during his tenure in Phoenix, Mr. Colby found it necesary to issue a directive to all U.S. military personnel participating in the program. One passage in the directive states that:

U.S. personnel . . . are specifically unauthorized to engage in assassinatiton.

Another passage states:

If an individual finds the police type activities of the Phoenix program repugnant to him . . . he can be reassigned from the program without prejudice.

In sum, the essence of Mr. Colby's defense against the charges that Phoenix was a program of indiscriminate murder, assassination, and torture is that war is dirty business, that the program was an essential part of the American war effort in South Vietnam, that he was aware of the abuses, that, as the military directive indicates, he made efforts to reduce them, that the abuses were isolated events, and that, in any event, he was simply carrying out a program ordered by the U.S. high command.

But no rationalization of Phoenix, no minimization of its abuses, no antiseptic label can conceal the fact that although Phoenix is the mythical bird of life and resurrection, Phoenix under Mr. Colby's tenue was a bird of death for 20,587 civilians of South Vietnam.

This Nation should never have been involved in Phoenix. Never again should a program like that be part of America's role in world affairs.

The other reservation I have about Mr. Colby involves the sort of leadership America wants for its CIA in the years ahead.

In recent years, the activities of the CIA, especially its secret operations, have come under increasing challenge at home and overseas. The gulf between the Agency's intelligence arm and its clandestine arm is well known. Especially in recent months, as highlighted by the unfolding disclosures of CIA involvement in the Watergate affair, the reputation of the Agency has been further diminished, because of its apparent involvement in domestic activities in violation of its charter.

I share the serious and growing doubts of many other Senators about the role of the CIA as it is presently constituted. Already, under the leadership of Senator STENNIS and Senator SYMINGTON, the Armed Services Committee has begun an extensive review of the CIA Act. There are many other signs as well that both the Senate and the House intend to exercise a far greater degree of oversight over the CIA in the future than has existed in the past.

But Congress cannot do the job alone. If the CIA is to fulfill its proper role in the decade of the seventies, it must have a director who is responsive and sympathetic to the need. As a man who has risen through the ranks of the Agency on its clandestine side, Mr. Colby symbolizes the side of the CIA that has become deeply embroiled in the present controversy over the Agency's foreign and domestic activities.

Perhaps the CIA continues to need this covert side to its operations—unquestionably, Mr. Colby is an outstanding choice to lead such a role as the CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, the position he now holds.

But, looking to the future of the country and the future of the CIA, I believe the United States has had enough secrecy and covert ideas and covert men. At the very least, the CIA needs a greater balance between its clandestine and its intelligence functions.

But William Colby is the epitome of the covert man. And so, although my opposition to him on this ground is in no sense a personal reflection on him, I do not believe that he should be the choice to strike that balance or to shape the Agency in the transitions that lie ahead.

One other point should be mentioned. In recent weeks, I have been troubled by a number of questions arising out of Mr. Colby's role as Executive Director of the CIA in certain aspects of the Watergate affair in 1972 and early 1973.

Although this aspect is not yet entirely free from doubt, the issue continues to be investigated by the Senate Select Committee and the special prosecutor.

I do, however, want to make clear that my vote against Mr. Colby's confirmation is not based on his relationship to Watergate.

In closing, let me say again that I respect the very high regard in which Mr. Colby is held by those who have known and worked with him. In many respects, he symbolizes the finest qualities of intellectual ability and personal sacrifice demonstrated by legions of able and unheralded American officials who have unselfishly dedicated their careers to the Nation's public service.

But, for the reasons stated, I am unable to approve his nomination.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the nomination.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, to me there is one basic problem looming behind the vote on the nomination of Mr. William Colby to be the new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. That problem is the vast power wielded by the Central Intelligence Agency itself.

When I reviewed the National Security Act of 1947, I was reminded once again that the CIA's power has largely developed within the statutory authority laid down by that act.

The bulk of the CIA's duties as defined by the National Security Act are related to advising the National Security Council and correlating and evaluating intelligence. The authority for the "dirty tricks" is contained in one short clause stating that it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council—

. . . to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct. (50 USC 403(d)(5).)

This means that the law gives the CIA, subject only to the approval of the National Security Council, a virtually free hand in conducting clandestine operations overseas, overthrowing foreign governments, training mercenaries, and even sponsoring assassination programs such as Phoenix—all in the name of national security.

Today it seems strange that Congress should have signed away such power. Knowing what we know now, we would probably have placed far more restrictions on the CIA's mandate. Perhaps a brief look at the cold war setting in which the National Security Act was drafted will help to show how badly change is needed.

The cold war spawned an increasing tendency to see overseas political developments in military terms and hence to let defense policy determine foreign policy, rather than the other way around. Prior to World War II, military officers had not been prominent decisionmakers in matters of foreign policy, but the cold war saw a dramatic reversal. Diplomats yielded their influence to professional soldiers and to civilians whose concern for military might surpassed even that of the generals.

In this framework, the political sys-

tem adopted by another country was automatically part of a worldwide contest between capitalism and communism, and thus either a threat or a boost to our national security. As President Truman said before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947:

> . . . totalitarian regimes imposed upon free people, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

National security had become a national mania. Accordingly, the powers of oversight and review were given to the two Armed Services Committees of House and Senate and to the Appropriations Committees, but not to the Foreign Relations Committees.

Today we know that what the CIA does has explosive foreign policy implication. In many countries of the world, American foreign policy has become closely associated with the CIA.

Today we know, too, that a radical movement somewhere in the world is not automatically a threat to our security. We know that economic strength and political leadership are as important, in their own way, as our arsenal of bombs and missiles.

Today the mood and atmosphere have changed, but the law has not.

And I think that is the most fundamental challenge facing the Congress on the question of the CIA—to bring the law into line with a democratic society and to place further restrictions on the CIA, its Director, and its activities.

Accordingly, I am introducing today a measure to set up a 1-year, ad hoc Select Committee on Foreign Intelligence, whose duties shall include recommendations on revising the National Security Act and taking other appropriate steps to bring the CIA under firmer supervision. This committee should address the basic questions of the CIA's mandate and the degree of power that is appropriate to that mandate. It should consider that power in the context of a democratic society. It should seek to lay down guidelines for the CIA's activities.

More broadly, however, the ad hoc committee that I am proposing should take a broad look at all our overseas intelligence activities, not just those of the CIA. It would be directed to study the implications of these activities for U.S. foreign policy, foreign economic policy, and defense policy, and to report its general findings to the full Senate.

Mr. President, I think we need a study committee of this kind even if an authorizing committee is set up relating to the CIA. I am delighted that the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE), who has provided such creative and constructive leadership in this field, plans to introduce a resolution to create a standing committee of the Senate on the CIA. I am delighted, too, that our wise and effective majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, is particularly interested in this move, and is devoting a considerable measure of his talents to the effort to bring the CIA under proper control.

I believe we also need a study committee because—too often—this country does one thing with the right hand and another with the left. There should be some group in the Senate that can stand back and look at the whole, briefly, without a permanent assignment, and thus without developing a domain of its own—in other words, without developing a constituent interest.

I also have some modest suggestions relating to curbing the power of the CIA short of a fundamental review and overhaul. I am offering these suggestions in the form of amendments to the National Security Act, and I will explain them in a moment. But first I want to make clear that I would prefer to have these suggestions acted upon by some sort of oversight committee or authorizing committee. But if the Senate does not establish either of these committees, I will push ahead with these amendments on my own.

My first proposal is to place a time limitation on the terms of the Director and Deputy Director of the CIA. As the law stands (50 U.S.C. 403(a)), the Director and Deputy Director shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. But there is no time limitation to that appointment. I propose a term of not to exceed 8 years. I do not feel that 8 years is a magic number. But I do think it important to place a time limitation on these positions so as to prevent the perpetuation of an "independent kingdom." I understand that the distinguished Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD) has introduced similar legislation to place a time limitation on the term of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

My second proposal would prevent the posts of Director and Deputy Director from being occupied by two "insiders" at the same time. According to existing law, at no time shall the two positions be occupied simultaneously by commissioned officers of the armed services. I suggest extending that restriction to individuals employed by the CIA within the last 5 years prior to their appointment.

By requiring that the posts of Director and Deputy Director shall not both be filled by "insiders" at the same time, my intention is to prevent the Agency from being run by "professionals' professionals" and subject it to some form of supervision from the outside. Just as a general should not be appointed Secretary of Defense, so the leadership of the CIA should not be drawn solely from within.

My third proposal is directed at the broad power granted to the CIA by the National Security Act to perform functions other than those related to the collection and analysis of information—the so-called "dirty tricks". I have already quoted that part of the National Security Act that conveys the authority for these operations.

My amendment would change that power in a very modest way by requiring not only the approval of the National Security Council, but the specific, written approval of the President as well. This is a small but important first step toward curbing the misuse of power.

Let me emphasize again that these are not final solutions but only modest first steps. And again, they should ideally be debated by an authorizing committee or by a committee specifically set up to study foreign intelligence activities in general and the CIA in particular.

I also want to make it clear that my motive in introducing this legislation is not punitive. I have considerable respect for the CIA. Nor is it directed at Mr. Colby personally. I recognize that he is a capable man who has won the respect of his colleagues and of many people outside of the Agency as well.

I have endeavored to find out all I could about Mr. Colby but, like Senator PROXMIRE, I have found that a difficult task. I concur with him that today the Senate will cast a blind vote on the Colby nomination.

I came on the floor today not knowing how I would vote. I have listened carefully to the debate. Primarily for some of the reasons advanced by two distinguished Senators, Senator HUGHES and Senator KENNEDY, I shall vote against him.

I shall vote against him also because William Colby is a symbol of the abuse of power.

We do not need to break the law to have effective intelligence operations. I believe in order, justice, and law.

My aim in the legislation I am proposing is simply to place limitations on the extraordinary power wielded by the Director of the CIA in the belief that such power is incompatible with our democratic system.

The legislation that I am introducing today is only a partial check on the virtually unfettered power enjoyed by the CIA. A crucial step not covered by my proposals, for example, is making public the budgets of the various intelligence agencies, including the CIA. I have already pursued this suggestion through letters to other Senators and through discussion in the Democratic Caucus, and I want to reiterate this concern today.

I have noted two encouraging developments in particular. First, during his confirmation hearing for his appointment as Secretary of Defense, Dr. James Schlesinger stated that publishing a gross figure for national intelligence programs would have a "minimal" effect on security concerns. In answer to determined questioning on a public budget figure by the distinguished Senator from Virginia (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.), he added:

> . . . for the gross national intelligence program figures, I think we could live with that on a security basis, yes.

And William Colby, the Director-designate of the CIA, stated that while budget totals have traditionally been classified, he would "defer to the appropriate congressional authorities" for any change. I read that as a message for us to go ahead with changing this unnecessarily supersecret tradition.

Mr. President, General Marshall used to say that political problems, if thought about in military terms, become military problems. Now the word "paramili-

tary"—from meaning "alongside of" or "related to"—has come into common use even though most standard dictionaries do not list it. I am afraid that without legislation to curb the CIA, political problems—already woefully militarized—will increasingly become paramilitary ones.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the proposed legislation be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution and bill were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 2321

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) section 102(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)) is amended by striking out the proviso at the end of such section and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "*Provided, however*, That at no time shall the two positions of the Director and Deputy Director be occupied simultaneously (1) by commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status, or (2) by individuals who have been in the employ of the Agency for any period of time during the five year period immediately preceding the time they are considered for appointment. No person may serve as Director for more than a total of eight years."

(b) The eight year limitation prescribed for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency by the amendment made by subsection (a) of this section shall begin to run on the date of enactment of this Act in the case of any person holding such office on such date of enactment.

SEC. 2. Paragraph (5) of section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d)(5)) is amended by striking out the period at the end of such paragraph and inserting in lieu thereof a comma and the following: "but only if the President specifically authorizes any such function or duty and notifies the Director in writing of his approval and includes in his notice a description of the function or duty authorized to be performed by the Agency."

S. RES. 152

A resolution to create a Select Committee of the Senate on Foreign Intelligence

Resolved, That Rule XXV, paragraph 1, of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by inserting a new subparagraph (f) and relettering the subsequent paragraphs accordingly. The new subparagraph (f) reads:

"(f) Select Committee on Foreign Intelligence, which shall be charged with

(1) conducing oversight and review of all foreign intelligence activities carried out by

(a) the Central Intelligence Agency

(b) the Defense Intelligence Agency

(c) the National Security Agency

(d) the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Air Force

(e) the Department of State

(f) the Atomic Energy Commission

(g) the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(h) any other U.S. Government department or agency which the Chairman of the Select Committee determines is carrying out foreign intelligence activities;

(2) to study the implications of such activities for United States foreign policy, foreign economic policy, and defense policy;

(3) to review the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 with a view toward recommending further restrictions on the duties, functions, and powers of the Central Intelligence Agency; and

(4) to report to the full Senate at the end of one year following the passage of this Resolution concerning its general findings.

SEC. 2. Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by inserting a new paragraph (4) and renumbering the subsequent paragraphs accordingly. The new paragraph reads:

"4. Without regard to paragraph 7 of this rule, the Select Committee on Foreign Intelligence shall have a term of one year and shall consist of seven members of the Senate, four from the majority party and three from the minority party. Two members shall be Senators who are concurrently serving on the Committee on Armed Services, and two shall be Senators who are concurrently serving on the Committee on Foreign Relations. The remaining three members shall be appointed by the President of the Senate upon the recommendation of the policy committees of the majority and the minority. The Select Committee shall select a Chairman and a Vice Chairman from among its members."

SEC. 3. The Select Committee is hereby authorized, for a period of one year following the passage of this Resolution,

(a) to adopt rules concerning its procedure,

(b) to hold hearings,

(c) to procure printing and binding,

(d) to make expenditures,

(e) to employ personnel, and

(f) to receive and deposit such written information as it may request from the various Departments and Agencies listed in Section 1, and to take all appropriate steps to safeguard, where necessary, the confidentiality of such information.

SEC. 4. For purposes of this Resolution—

"foreign intelligence activities" means all activities conducted in, or directed toward, areas other than the United States and its territories and possessions, and relating to,

(a) the gathering of information, and

(b) the planning, conduct, and execution of political, economic, or military activities whose existence is not generally or publicly acknowledged by the United States Government.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Illinois may be yielded 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Illinois is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, at an executive session of the Committee on Foreign Relations on February 7, 1973, I expressed to Mr. Richard Helms my feeling that the CIA should have no direct relationship with the briefing or training of domestic police, law enforcement, or internal security personnel. I said that I believed those functions should be carried out by the FBI.

I was aghast to learn that the CIA had engaged in a training program or in training sessions at the request of the Chicago Police Department, among other police departments of the United States, with techniques that were described to us in executive session. I said that I felt this action simply had no place in the CIA and contravened the authority granted by Congress to the CIA, which was supposed to engage in activities outside the United States. I said that the FBI had adequate resources to carry on this assistance, but that if the CIA had information that could be used, it should be transmitted to the FBI, because the FBI had direct responsibility for domestic activities, and that the CIA should stay totally and completely away from that area.

I described also my concern because I had just recently visited South Korea, where there is an agency known as the CIA, which then engaged in international activities besides also engaging in domestic activities. That is a most distrusted agency, and I wanted no implication that our CIA could ever become involved in domestic affairs right here in the United States.

Mr. Helms responded that he would convey this information to the new Director and said he was sure that he would abide by it.

On May 21, 1973, at an open session with Mr. Helms, I asked him if he had in fact conveyed this position to his successor as Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. James Schlesinger. He responded:

I did not talk to Dr. Schlesinger directly about this. I conveyed the sense of the Committee's statement and the Senator's statement of the General Counsel of the Agency, which was conveyed to Dr. Schlesinger. And a few days before I left to go to my post in Iran, I was informed that Senator Fulbright had written a letter to the Director embodying in his letter these strictures. So I assume that, therefore, the messages had not only gotten through but the new Director would abide by it.

The letter from Senator FULBRIGHT to Mr. Schlesinger was dated February 8, 1973, and said that members of the committee present at the executive session the day before had reached a consensus "that the FBI was the proper agency to carry on such activities—involving assistance to local police departments—and that they should be discontinued by the CIA." Senator FULBRIGHT said he wanted to underscore the point and to request Mr. Schlesinger's comments after he had familiarized himself with the matter.

Mr. Schlesinger responded by letter to Senator FULBRIGHT on March 1, 1973, stating:

I have given this matter careful attention, and am satisfied that the Agency's activities in this connection have been consistent with the letter and spirit of existing legislation. However, in keeping with the sensitivity of this matter I have directed that such activities be undertaken in the future only in the most compelling circumstances and with my personal approval. We will, of course, comply with applicable laws and regulations regarding coordination with other Federal agencies.

Before voting on Mr. Colby's nomination, I wanted to assure myself that he was acquainted with the discussion and correspondence between members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and Messrs. Helms and Schlesinger on this matter.

I was particularly concerned to have Mr. Colby's own views, since Mr. Schlesinger—in his letter to Senator FULBRIGHT—had left the door ajar on this question by indicating that such activities would be undertaken in the future "only in the most compelling circumstances and with my personal approval."

Therefore, I have raised this issue with Mr. Colby, who has responded that he would undertake such activities only in the most extraordinary circumstances and that—if the circumstances appeared to him to be that extraordinary—he would consult with the congressional oversight committee before acting. This reply is satisfactory to me, and I believe

it indicates rather clearly Mr. Colby's intention to be responsive to Congress.

One of the difficulties which has caused problems for the CIA in its relations with the Congress has been CIA's reluctance to seek congressional guidance on sensitive matters. While one can appreciate that a concern for security may often stifle any inclination toward candor, it is important now that the Agency be completely forthcoming with Congress.

I shall vote for Mr. Colby's confirmation because he is a man demonstrating competence, integrity, and ability. I feel that he will always consult with the Congress when desirable and will keep us advised of CIA activities which have a bearing on our own constitutional responsibilities in the fields of national security and foreign affairs.

Speaking personally, I have had 6 years of extremely fine experience with one of Mr. Colby's predecessors—Mr. Helms. I have always found the briefings I have had, not only concerning this country by also countries abroad, among the most intelligent and penetrating which has helped me immensely in my work as a U.S. Senator. I might say that I received great help, indeed, in working with the floor leader today in the matter of the ABM. I could not have had more assistance and help in reaching a conclusion than I did from finding who would know the policy decisions best based on objective facts, enabling me to come to my conclusion, one which I feel sure is ultimately shared by the administration as well.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator from Illinois for his kind remarks, am very grateful.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, first, let me say to the Senators from Iowa. Massachusetts, Wisconsin, California, and Illinois that they have made a real contribution in outlining some of the things most needed to be done to supervise the CIA and which definitely should be done.

I should also like to commend the acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), for the manner in which he held the hearings on the confirmation of Mr. Colby.

This is a very important confirmation to a very important post. I would also like to agree and take the position the Senator from Missouri took so far as the need for creating a real supervisory committee is concerned.

I commend the Senator from Missouri for his ideas on investigating not only the charter of the CIA but also the possibility of letting the total budget figures be known so far as the intelligence community is concerned.

I have had numerous conversations with Senators and, at the present time, the total figure, if we were given that total figure, and if it were made known, would not only eliminate any doubts about the Intelligence Agency, but would also eliminate any doubt about the overall Defense Department budget figures.

I can only agree with the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) when he said, in effect, that it taints the entire defense budget when it is put into different items so that we have no way of segregating out what is for intelligence and what is not.

Mr. President, it is important to realize that certain subdivisions and certain breakdowns will have to be looked at carefully, even if we get the budget figures made public. But the Senator from Missouri, the acting chairman, who has said that he will go into the matter, is to be commended, because it is one of great importance.

The Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) has also stated that he is going into the matter of the charter and I should like to commend him for that.

In closing, I should like to say that I have attended the hearings on the Colby confirmation. Mr. Colby has integrity. He has experience to do the job. It is one of the most important jobs in Government. I believe that the CIA now needs leadership perhaps more than any other branch or agency in the Government. It is awfully important.

I am therefore going to cast my vote for his confirmation.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, although I intend to vote for the confirmation of Mr. Colby, I will do so with some misgivings. My concern does not go to Mr. Colby's integrity or to his professional competence because I have no grounds for doubt in either of these areas. I am, however, troubled by the practice of placing the vast responsibilities exercised by the Director of Central Intelligence in the hands of someone whose experience has been devoted almost exclusively to clandestine intelligence operations.

In my view there is a real need to insulate the analytic process from the operational side of the intelligence business and I am not certain that a Director who is operationally oriented will be sufficiently sensitive to this problem. Perhaps Mr. Colby is aware of this problem but we cannot feel any assurance on this score precisely because his background is so little known to us. Substantial reorganization of the Agency's structure apparently began under the last Director and presumably will continue under Mr. Colby. I have serious questions whether the overt operations—which we have judged the most valuable, especially in the estimates field—might not suffer and might not be disrupted by undue emphasis on clandestine operations.

I am also concerned over the possibility that the intelligence community is coming under increasing pressure from political, policymaking officials. In recent years White House and NSC officials are reported to have brought great pressure on the intelligence evaluation process and to have co-opted many functions previously entrusted to career professionals. This trend has become pronounced under this administration and again we know very little about Mr. Colby's attitude in this regard.

Finally, I am disturbed by Mr. Colby's connection with the Phoenix program in South Vietnam. I cannot condone a U.S.-financed program of political intimidation and assassination—even though the Vietcong engaged in the same practices—and I am far from confident that Mr. Colby was sufficiently sensitive to the abuses which were attributed to the Phoenix program while it was under his direction.

Thus although I will vote for Mr. Colby, I would hope that the Senate will give careful attention to the manner in which he exercises his responsibilities and to the questions which I have raised regarding the operation of the intelligence community.

Finally, I wish to add, that the endorsement of Mr. Colby by Senator SYMINGTON, acting chairman of the Armed Services Committee and a valued member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, carries great weight with me. Senator SYMINGTON has assured me that Mr. Colby will report to the committees of the Senate and that he is confident that Mr. Colby recognizes that Congress has a responsibility and a right to know what the Intelligence Agency is doing.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DOMENICI). All time has now been yielded back.

The question is, Shall the Senate advise and consent to the nomination of William E. Colby, of Maryland, to be Director of Central Intelligence?

On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) is necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. ABOUREZK) is absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) is absent because of illness.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. ABOUREZK) would vote "nay."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) is absent because of illness in his family.

The result was announced—yeas 83, nays 13, as follows:

[No. 361 Ex.]

YEAS—83

Aiken	Fannin	Muskie
Allen	Fong	Nunn
Baker	Fulbright	Packwood
Bartlett	Griffin	Pastore
Bayh	Gurney	Pearson
Beall	Hansen	Pell
Bellmon	Hartke	Percy
Bennett	Hatfield	Proxmire
Bentsen	Helms	Randolph
Bible	Hollings	Ribicoff
Brock	Hruska	Roth
Brooke	Huddleston	Saxbe
Buckley	Humphrey	Schweiker
Burdick	Inouye	Scott, Pa.
Byrd, Harry F., Jr.	Jackson	Scott, Va.
	Javits	Sparkman
Byrd, Robert C.	Johnston	Stafford
Case	Long	Stevens
Chiles	Magnuson	Stevenson
Cook	Mathias	Symington
Cotton	McClellan	Taft
Curtis	McClure	Talmadge
Dole	McGee	Thurmond
Domenici	McIntyre	Tower
Dominick	Metcalf	Tunney
Eagleton	Mondale	Weicker
Eastland	Montoya	Williams
Ervin	Moss	Young

NAYS—13

Biden	Hart	Mansfield
Church	Haskell	McGovern
Clark	Hathaway	Nelson
Cranston	Hughes	
Gravel	Kennedy	

NOT VOTING—4

Abourezk	Goldwater	Stennis
Cannon		

So Mr. Colby's nomination was confirmed.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be notified.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AN ADDRESS BY CIA DIRECTOR, WILLIAM E. COLBY

HON. LUCIEN N. NEDZI

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 14, 1974

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Speaker, few Americans would dispute that an effective central intelligence agency is vital to the security of the United States.

Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that there continues to be some unease in the land about the conduct of intelligence gathering, its underlying philosophy, and its possible abuses. A strong measure of reassurance is needed.

The top men in our intelligence services rarely "go public." When they do, their remarks deserve our close attention.

Accordingly, I am pleased to place in the RECORD the recent address of William E. Colby, Director of the CIA. Of particular interest is Mr. Colby's description of how technology has revolutionized the intelligence business in the years since the U-2.

Entitled "Foreign Intelligence for America," the address was delivered on May 3, 1974, at the well-known forum, the Los Angeles World Affairs Council.

The address follows:

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICA

(By William E. Colby)

Foreign intelligence has a long tradition in America. One of our earliest national heroes, Nathan Hale, was an intelligence agent. Our first President, General Washington, was an assiduous director and user of intelligence. Intelligence has changed in recent years, however, and today its reality is different from its traditional meaning. In the common understanding, intelligence is still linked with secrecy and spying. But what I would like to talk about tonight is the way we in America have changed the scope of the word "intelligence," so that it has come to mean something different from that old-fashioned perception. These changes have stemmed from characteristics peculiar to America and from the nature of our society.

The first and most dramatic change in today's meaning of the word "intelligence" stems from the technological genius of Americans. We have applied to intelligence the talents of our inventors, of our engineers, and of our scientists. In the short space of eighteen years since the U-2 began its missions, we have revolutionized intelligence. In 1960 this country engaged in a great debate as to whether there was a missile gap between the Soviet Union and ourselves. Today the facts are so well established that such a debate is impossible. Then we had to try to deduce from bits of circumstantial evidence how many missiles the Soviets had; today we see and count them. We wondered then what new missiles the Soviets might be developing; today we follow their tests and determine from them the range, the size and the effectiveness of such missiles.

This technical contribution to intelligence not only provides a better basis for decisions about the national security of the United States, it also enables us to negotiate agreements such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Over the years such limitation treaties were always stopped by one essential feature: the United States needed some assurance that the other party would abide by a treaty's restraints. Thus we came up with the "open skies" proposal and tried to negotiate on-site inspection procedures. The Soviet leaders rejected these because they believed such measures would permit foreigners an undue degree of access to their sovereign territory.

It was only after American intelligence developed the ability to monitor such agreements from afar, through technical means, that we on our side became sufficiently confident to begin the process of mutual arms limitation. In the text of the first SALT agreement, intelligence in fact was even admitted to polite diplomatic society under the name of "national technical means of verification."

Technology has revolutionized the intelligence business in many other ways beyond those I just described. They provide a precision to our knowledge of the world around us, which was inconceivable fifteen years ago. I might add that I give full credit to the many talents here in California which have contributed immensely to this effort.

The second major contribution America has made to intelligence stemmed in part from a bad American habit. This was our habit of disbanding our intelligence machinery at the end of every war, requiring us to reassemble one hastily at the beginning of a new war. Thus we abandoned intelligence in the period after World War I, when Secretary of State Stimson is alleged to have commented that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail." We disbanded the Office of Strategic Services in October 1945, only to establish a new central intelligence apparatus to help meet the Cold War in 1947.

This habitual exercise provided something new in 1942. We were faced then with the urgent need to provide intelligence support to our governmental and military leadership about such disparate areas of the world as the North African littoral, the "hump" between China and India, and distant Pacific islands. General William Donovan, our first director of central intelligence, mobilized the talents of academia and industry to assemble every possible American source of information on these subjects.

This central pool of intellectual talent proved its worth and provided the base for the second major American contribution to the intelligence profession. While certainly the collection of information is vital to intelligence, an equally vital contribution comes from the analysis, assessment and estimating process. The analytic staff within the Central Intelligence Agency has access to all the raw information on foreign areas available to our Government, ranging from that which is completely public to the most secret products of our worldwide collection apparatus. It subjects this information to the intellectual talents and experience of its membership, which in scope and scholarship can rival those of our large universities. It then produces objective and reasoned assessments of developments around the world and projections of likely future trends.

Some of the work of this corps of experts has come to light through the revelation of the Pentagon Papers, in which the various national estimates on Vietnam were shown to have been independent, objective assessments of the likely future course of events there. This is not the time or place to debate American involvement in Vietnam and the many factors which influenced it; I mention these reports only to demonstrate what this assessment process can contribute: an independent and objective assessment of a foreign situation, unaffected by political commitments or departmental parochialism.

As has been reported in the press, I have made certain changes in the bureaucratic structure through which these assessments are produced, but the estimating process in its essential remains as it was. I hope I have even reinforced it by my own insistence that

honest differences among the experts must be fully reflected in our final output rather than concealed under useless generalizations.

America's success in this assessment process perhaps influenced the formation by the Soviets a few years ago of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. The Soviets apparently have recognized, as we did long ago, that it is as important to study and try to understand American society as it would be to spy on it. While some other nations also consider assessment a part of their intelligence process, I know of none which can match the investment we in America have made in research and analysis as an integral element of our intelligence mechanism. The product delivered to our policy-makers has often demonstrated the value of this investment, and opened new perspectives for the concept of intelligence.

American intelligence presents another unique feature. It must operate within the tradition of an open society in America. But, as General Washington once noted, "upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises" of intelligence. These principles are not easily reconcilable, and we are breaking new ground in intelligence doctrine as we try to resolve the dilemma between them.

Part of our solution to this problem appears in the National Security Act of 1947, providing that CIA have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers, or internal security functions, i.e., that it is restricted to foreign intelligence. This limitation is clearly recognized among our employees, although my predecessors and I have candidly admitted that CIA made mistakes with respect to the wig and other equipment and the psychological profile provided to the Watergate "plumbers." I am confident and have assured the Congress publicly that it will be respected in the future.

The 1947 Act recognized the other horn of our dilemma when it charged the Director of Central Intelligence with responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. It is this charge that led my predecessors and me to take such Constitutional steps as are possible to retain the essential secrets of intelligence. In this respect we have at least one common interest with the profession of journalism: we are both interested in the protection of our sources.

We are currently engaged in the courts in an effort to enforce the secrecy agreement that one of our ex-employees signed when he came to work with us. In it he acknowledged that he would be receiving sensitive information and agreed to hold it secret unless we released it. We are not objecting to most of a book he proposed to write, even including about half of the items that we initially identified as technically classified. We are struggling, however, to prevent the publication of the names of a number of foreigners, publicity which could do substantial injury to individuals who once put their confidence in us. Similarly, we hope to withhold the details of specific operations where exposure could prevent our receipt of further information of great value. In some cases, the publication of the fact of our knowledge of a situation can be of major assistance to another nation in deducing how we must have learned of it and shutting us off from it. I might add that we do not censor our ex-employees' opinions. We have cleared several such books full of criticism, in which the authors have been careful not to reveal our sources or operations. The most serious aspect of this struggle is that if we cannot protect our sources and methods, friendly foreign officials and individuals will be less forthcoming with us in the future, when it could be of critical importance to our country. No serious intelligence professional has ever believed that General Washington's maxim could be replaced by a variation of the Wilsonian approach to covenants, or "open intelligence openly arrived at."

Another unique aspect of American intelligence is our relationship to the Congress. Some of my foreign counterparts around the world display considerable shock when they learn that I appeared in an open hearing before the television cameras as a part of my Senate confirmation. Many of them would never be subjected to detailed scrutiny by their Parliament, and their identities are frequently totally unknown. Some months ago, for example, two journalists were prosecuted in Sweden—hardly a closed society—for revealing the startling fact that their country had an intelligence service. In our country our intelligence authority stems from an act of Congress, it is subject to oversight by the Congress, and it depends upon funds appropriated annually by the Congress.

The Congress has provided for itself a way of resolving the dilemma between the need for secrecy in intelligence and the demands of our open society. Those Senators and Congressmen designated to exercise oversight of CIA or review its budgets are fully informed of our activities, inspect us at will, and are given detailed and specific answers to any questions they raise. Other individual Senators and Congressmen and other committees frequently receive the same intelligence assessments of the world situation as are provided to the Executive Branch, on a classified basis, but they are not provided the operational details of our intelligence activities. This arrangement was established by the Congress and is of course subject to change. My own position is that the method by which Congress exercises its oversight of intelligence activity is a matter for the Congress to decide.

As a related aspect of American intelligence in this open society, I might say something about our relations with the public and the press. We do not conduct a public relations program; we are not in the public information business. But we do make as much information as possible available to the news media and to the public. Groups of our citizens, including high school students, have visited our facilities, where we try to respond to their questions about the nature of American intelligence.

Thus we in the intelligence profession are aware that ours must be an intelligence effort conducted on American principles and that it must be more open and responsive to our public than the intelligence activities of other nations. At the same time, we must respect the essential professional requirement embodied in the National Security Act to protect our intelligence sources and methods. We will consequently continue to arouse wonderment from some of our foreign associates as to our openness, and concern among some American citizens that we still must keep some information secret if we are to conduct an intelligence effort at all.

Technical intelligence, the intellectual process of assessment, and our exposure to our Constitutional authorities and the public are three major contributions America has made to the intelligence profession. I do not want to be accused, however, of concealing the fact that intelligence still requires clandestine activity. Our technical intelligence and our study and assessment of material openly available throughout the world have certainly revolutionized the intelligence profession in the past twenty years. But they have not removed the needs of our national policy-makers for information on the intentions of other powers. They have not removed the need to identify at an early stage research abroad into some new weapon which might threaten the safety of our nation, so that we do not become aware of a new and overpowering threat, especially from a nation not as open as ours, too late to negotiate about it or protect ourselves.

The need for clandestine collection can perhaps be illustrated by comparing the task facing me with that facing Mr. Andropov, the head of the KGB in the Soviet Union. Mr. Andropov faces a veritable cornucopia of easily acquired information about America from published and public sources. Out of this, he must pick those facts which are significant and assemble them into an accurate assessment of America. My task is to search for individual facts kept in the utmost secrecy in closed societies, and with these few facts try to construct whole assessments, in somewhat the way one extrapolates a reproduction of the skeleton of a *Brontosaurus* from a thigh bone. Without the contributions of clandestinely acquired information, our *Brontosaurus* could in some situations be very deformed indeed.

Simple prudence, of course, causes us to use clandestine collection only when the information is available in no other way and is of real value to our country. My point is that such situations do exist. Thus we will continue to need Americans and friendly foreigners willing to undertake clandestine intelligence missions. I might add only that we must do a better job of training future generations of American intelligence officers and agents than Nathan Hale received in a one-day briefing and the advice to place his reports in his shoes.

From this description we see that intelligence in today's complicated world is a complex affair. It must warn our Government of new generations of intercontinental missiles being developed, it must be attentive to foreign economic threats to America's strength and well being, and it must identify political problems around the world which can adversely affect our interests. The very complexity of the challenge has led to the active collaboration of all the different elements of the American Government which can contribute to the process of information collection and national assessment. President Nixon has charged my predecessors and me with the leadership of this Intelligence Community and has provided certain interdepartmental mechanisms through which to implement this charge. This charge of leadership for the entire American intelligence process applies to the substance of our intelligence needs and to the resources devoted to intelligence. It puts on me the responsibility of preventing separate bureaucratic interests from impinging on the effectiveness or raising the cost of our national intelligence effort.

This then is foreign intelligence in and for America today. It reflects the technical and intellectual talents of America, it reflects our open society, it reflects the courage and integrity of our professional intelligence officers. Most important of all, it provides American policy-makers with critical information and reasoned assessments about the complex foreign political, economic and military challenges to our national security and welfare. It is designed to help us to achieve and to live in peace, rather than to protect us only in time of war. It has become an important and permanent element of our national foreign policy structure. We Americans who are a part of it are proud of it, and of the improvements we Americans have brought to a profession which can be traced at least to Moses, who sent a man from each tribe to "spy out" the land of Canaan.

Thank you very much.

NEW YORK TIMES AUGUST 3 1975

Modern Intelligence: Myth and Reality

By William E. Colby

WASHINGTON—The Aztecs thought the Sun God had to be strengthened each day by the sacrifice of a young man or woman. Without the sacrifice the sun could not rise.

The *myth* of the Sun God's need drove the nation through the daily travail of the sacrifice.

The *reality* of astronomy to explain the sunrise was unknown.

Today we have myths about our intelligence. They are expressed in sensational catchwords: "dirty tricks," "invisible government," "terminate with extreme prejudice," "lie to anyone but the President," "infiltration of the White House," "destabilization," "secret war," "massive illegal."

They come from old, outmoded ideas about intelligence: espionage, intrigue, derring-do.

These myths achieve lives of their own. Formal denials, evidence to the contrary, and independent, serious, follow-up assessments of the true proportions of a catch phrase never overtake the original allegation. The myth becomes accepted as reality.

In normal times, these myths are but part of the life of an intelligence professional, like the anonymity and the lonely challenges, intellectual as well as physical, of a demanding craft.

Today, however, these individual myths are gaining momentum and mass. They tend to portray intelligence as unconstitutional, improper, unwanted by our citizens. They threaten American intelligence's ability to contribute to the political, economic and military safety and welfare of our nation. These myths threaten intelligence's ability to help our country to negotiate with—not confront—opponents in an unsettled world.

If we believe these myths, we can make our own mistaken Aztec sacrifice—American intelligence—in the belief that only thus can the democratic sun of our free society rise.

We must not sacrifice a virile, a necessary, contributor to the safety of our nation, the welfare of our citizens, and peacekeeping in the world of the future to a handful of myths. The reality of intelligence today is as different from the myths about it as the reality of astronomy from the Aztec myth of the sunrise.

Let's note some of the realities:

Our careful centralization of foreign information from open, public sources provides us with a compendium and continuity of facts.

America's technical genius has revolutionized intelligence. It has given us new views of distant objects, new abilities to analyze and absorb masses of data and detail, new electronic ways to keep up with the fast-moving and complex world of today.

To these must still be added that information that we can only get from the resourceful, dedicated clandestine operator. He is the only one who can overcome the barriers of the closed and hostile societies that share our planet. He can tell us of secret plans for tomorrow or the research ideas of today. He tells us of the human interaction—something no technology can show—among groups and leaders of closed societies.

Experts of independence, talent and



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intellectual integrity study this wealth of reporting. They write objective assessments of world affairs free from domestic political bias or Government departments' budget desires.

Intelligence collection and analysis cover not only military threats but political problems and economic dangers as well. Intelligence forecasts of future trends abroad permit us to make national decisions about future foreign threats in time to react.

Intelligence permits us to negotiate international differences before they become disputes. And today the excellence of our information now contributes to a new role for intelligence: peacemaking and peacekeeping.

With sure information about the plans, capabilities and dispositions of the political and military forces on both sides of foreign crises, we can clarify their misunderstandings of each other that might lead them to go to war; we can reassure both sides of getting from us early warning of hostile moves by the other side.

Perhaps the strongest myths relate to the Central Intelligence Agency's mission of covert political and paramilitary action. Today's reality is that little of this nature is done. What is done is fully controlled by the policy levels of our Government and is reported to committees of the Congress.

This, then, is the reality of modern intelligence. We understand why the myths arose, as we understand why the Aztec myth was born, but serious and scientific investigations by the Congressional committees examining intelligence will clarify the need of our free society for intelligence and show the excellence of the intelligence structure that serves it. They should also show the true proportions of the missteps of the past, and the national atmosphere in which they occurred.

With this new perception of reality should also come clear direction and effective supervision. This will insure that the new reality remains fully compatible with our free society. For this, too, is a reality of American intelligence, that it must conform to the will of the American public as well as our constitutional procedures.

This need not include some new myth that "the public has a right to know" everything. The citizen does have a right to expect that this new reality of intelligence will protect his country's essential secrets.

We protect other American secrets: proceedings of grand juries, diplomacy, trade, income tax and census data, although intelligence secrets are being exposed in unprecedented, and dangerous, volume.

Secrecy is not new in America. Intelligence professionals accept, indeed seek, a better discipline to enforce adherence to the fundamental obligation of intelligence, that it protect its sources.

With public understanding of the realities of American intelligence, we can avoid a useless Aztec sacrifice. Nor need we believe that ultimate myth: that America does not have the responsibility and restraint necessary to have the best intelligence service in the world.

William E. Colby is the Director of Central Intelligence.







CHICAGO TRIBUNE
1 SEPTEMBER 1975

Harris Survey

Majority says save the CIA

By Louis Harris

BY A 47 to 27 per cent plurality, Americans favor "making the Central Intelligence Agency more accountable to civilian authorities, but not changing the way it is now run," according to the results of the latest Harris Survey.

By 80 to 6 per cent, a large majority of those surveyed rejects the notion of "abolishing the CIA and leaving the U. S. with no foreign intelligence agency."

A 45 to 34 per cent plurality also opposes "abolishing the CIA, but starting a new foreign intelligence agency with proper civilian controls and safeguards."

THE RESULTS of this survey, conducted recently among a cross-section of 1,403 adults nationwide, make it clear that Americans are opposed to the abolition of the CIA, altho they support steps to make the security agency more accountable to the elected officials in government. By 43 to 31 per cent, a plurality would also support a move to "put in a civilian head of the CIA, but not abolishing it."

On a number of specific areas, however, those surveyed are critical of the CIA:

- By 74 to 11 per cent, a majority believes "it was wrong for the CIA to be involved in the assassination attempts of foreign leaders."
- By 54 to 29 per cent, a majority also believes "it was wrong for the CIA to have spied on Americans here at home during the Viet Nam war."
- By 49 to 21 per cent, a plurality agrees with the charge that "the trouble with the CIA is that it got out of control of civilian authorities."
- And by 66 to 18 per cent, a sizable majority believes that "in the future, the CIA must be monitored more closely by Congress and the White House."



A symbol on the rise.

But by a convincing majority, 52 to 24 per cent, those surveyed reject the charge that "if it had not been exposed, the CIA might have taken over the country." To the contrary, Americans value maintaining the CIA despite some errors it has committed recently. Also:

- By 78 to 12 per cent, a solid majority believes "it is very important that the U. S. have the best foreign intelligence agency in the world, even if it does make some mistakes."
- By 71 to 13 per cent, a majority also believes that "any successful foreign intelligence agency must be operated in secrecy."
- By 52 to 28 per cent, the public is worried that "so many secrets of the CIA have been made public that the future ability of the CIA to operate well has now been threatened."
- By 40 to 27 per cent, a plurality is convinced that "most of the CIA's activities involve serious study of other countries and are not involved with spying or violence."

In the last year, the public has given the CIA negative marks in Harris Surveys, but that criticism has not been rising despite more recent disclosures about the agency's alleged wrong-doing. The Harris Survey asked its respondents:

"How would you rate the job the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] has done as the chief source of foreign intelligence for the U. S. government—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?"

	Positive	Negative	Not sure
	%	%	%
August, 1975	36	45	19
January	34	39	27
September, 1974	31	42	27

As the CIA has become a better known institution in the last year, the number of Americans who give it a positive rating has risen 5 points, altho the agency's negative marks also have risen 3 points. Its ratings tend to parallel those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal law-enforcement agencies.

THE VARIOUS bodies that have been investigating the CIA have not been building enormous reservoirs of public confidence. The cross-section was asked:

"There have been several recent investigations of the CIA. Do you feel the [read list] investigations have been fair and just, too harsh on the CIA, or a whitewash of the CIA?"

	Fair and just	Too harsh	Whitewash	Not sure
	%	%	%	%
Rockefeller commission	33	6	28	33
U.S. Senate Church Committee	28	8	11	53
U.S. House Intelligence Committee	26	6	13	55

The result of the probes of CIA has been to produce public sentiment for a change in the way the foreign intelligence agency does its job. But it is also apparent that the public does not want a change so drastic that it would jeopardize current CIA operations or lead to the agency's abolition.

Instead, the public appears to want the CIA to go about its business, most of which is secret, but with greater accountability to Congress and the White House.

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NEW YORK TIMES
29 June 1974

The C.I.A. and the Public

By William E. Colby

The following article is adapted from speech that William E. Colby, Direc- of Central Intelligence, gave before Los Angeles World Affairs Coun- In it, he alludes to the book "The and the Cult of Intelligence," by tor Marchetti, who worked for the A. for fourteen years as a Soviet- litary specialist and executive as- tant to the deputy director, and n D. Marks, an analyst and staff istant to the intelligence director the State Department.

The Central Intelligence Agency is rently engaged in the courts in an rt to enforce the secrecy agreement one of our ex-employes signed en he came to work with us. In it acknowledged that he would be eiving information and agreed to d it secret unless we released it.

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Another unique aspect of American intelligence is our relationship to Congress. Some of my foreign counterparts around the world display considerable shock when they learn that I appeared in an open hearing before the television cameras as a part of my Senate confirmation.

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As a related aspect of American intelligence in this open society, I might say something about our relations with the public and the press. We do not conduct a public-relations program; we are not in the public-information business. But we do make as much information as possible available to the news media and to the public. Groups of our citizens, including high-school students, have visited our facilities, where we try to respond to their questions about the nature of American intelligence.

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But they have not removed the needs of our national policymakers for information on the intentions of other powers. They have not removed the need to identify at an early stage research abroad into some new weapon which might threaten the safety of our nation, so that we do not become aware of a new and overpowering threat, especially from a nation not as open as ours, too late to negotiate about it or to protect ourselves.

Statement

by

W. E. Colby

Director of Central Intelligence

before

House of Representatives

Select Committee on Intelligence

August 4, 1975

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to have this opportunity to present to you today the structure of the United States Intelligence Community, and to provide what I hope will prove to be insight into how it is organized and how it operates. I understand that you ask that I focus today on the Community as a whole, and turn to CIA specifically on Wednesday. I also understand that you wish especially to cover our budget procedures and the budgets themselves, as a way of investigating the degree of what might be called the command and control of this important activity. I will cover as much as I believe possible in this open session; I will then seek your agreement to cover the remainder in executive session. I know we will debate the need for such a step, but I would hope we could proceed first with the open part.

"Community" is a particularly apt phrase to describe the structure that performs the important task of providing intelligence to our Government. The Intelligence Community exists in the same sense as does any group of people involved in a common endeavor. It is a set of bodies (in this case, Governmental ones) operating within a fairly well understood procedural framework which enables its members to pursue a common objective: providing intelligence to those that need it.

COMMUNITY MEMBERS

The Intelligence Community involves all or part of the activities of several departments and agencies of the Executive Branch:

Central Intelligence Agency

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

National Security Agency

Army, Navy and Air Force military intelligence organizations

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Treasury Department

Energy Research and Development Administration

There are, in addition, a variety of intelligence-related activities which, while not a part of the Community as such, nonetheless make significant contributions to information available to the overall U. S. intelligence effort. Among these are general reporting from our embassies abroad and the intelligence activities integral to our military force structure (referred to as "tactical intelligence").

This Community reflects the basic intelligence concept contained in the National Security Act of 1947. This established the Central Intelligence Agency under the National Security Council to advise the NSC concerning foreign intelligence activities of the other

governmental departments and agencies, to recommend to the National Security Council the coordination of the intelligence activities of other departments and agencies, and to perform services of common concern centrally. It was provided, however, that other departments and agencies should continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate what was identified as departmental intelligence, i. e., intelligence for departmental purposes. The Act clearly contemplates the present structure of the agencies and departments working on their own on matters of individual interest but coordinating and collaborating with the Central Intelligence Agency to provide the best service to the National Security Council.

THE DCI'S ROLE

Under provisions of a Presidential memorandum issued in November 1971, which was reaffirmed by President Ford, I have been charged to report to the President and the Congress on "all U. S. Intelligence programs." Specifically, I am under instructions to:

-- Assume leadership of the Intelligence Community

-- Improve the intelligence product

-- Review all intelligence activities and recommend the appropriate allocation of resources

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

The Community keeps the Congress informed of its activities through the mechanism the Congress has established: the designated subcommittees of both the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. We appear before these subcommittees to discuss and report on U. S. foreign intelligence programs and to support the detailed budgetary aspects of the programs. Through formal executive session presentations, testimony, and question and answer sessions, senior intelligence officers provide information to the appropriate level of detail desired by Committee members. For example, in considering the FY 1976 Intelligence Community program now before Congress, I appeared before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on six separate occasions--four times on the Community program and twice on the CIA budget. In addition, I provided written responses to over two hundred Committee questions. In addition, Dr. Hall, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, testified on the DOD portions of the Community programs and provided written responses to about two hundred Committee questions. Various individual program managers provided similar extensive testimony.

I also appear regularly before various Congressional Committees and Subcommittees (in addition to the oversight groups) to provide

briefings and intelligence analyses on world affairs. I also maintain daily liaison with the Congress through my Legislative Counsel and provide substantive inputs to questions as they are raised in the normal course of business.

GUIDANCE

Within the Executive Branch there are a number of sources of guidance to the Intelligence Community. I have direct contact with the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In addition to this personal contact, several organizational mechanisms exist which provide direction or guidance to me as leader of the Intelligence Community and as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency:

-- The National Security Council [the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and, as advisors, the Chairman, JCS (military advisor) and the DCI (intelligence advisor)]

-- The various committees and groups of the NSC, particularly the NSC Intelligence Committee (NSCIC).

-- The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

-- The Office of Management and Budget

THE NSC MECHANISM

In addition to being an advisor to the National Security Council itself, I am a member of, or am represented on, various NSC groups and committees. In these, I provide information and judgments about foreign developments which impact on national security policy. While my participation is involved primarily with the substance of intelligence, I also receive guidance and important insights concerning the management of the U. S. intelligence effort.

The NSC Intelligence Committee is charged directly with providing direction and guidance on national intelligence needs, and with evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the user. This Committee is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Members are: the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman, JCS, and the DCI.

The 40 Committee of the NSC provides policy guidance and approval for any CIA activity abroad other than intelligence collection and production -- the so-called covert action mission. It is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Its members are: the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, JCS, and I.

THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD (PFIAB)

This Board is the direct descendant of the board of consultants recommended by the second Hoover Commission in 1955. President Eisenhower created the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities by Executive Order in 1956. It has been continued by all Presidents since then. The Board, now known as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), was most recently continued by President Nixon's E. O. 11460, dated March 20, 1969. It consists of prominent Americans from outside the Government appointed by the President: Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.), Chairman; Dr. William O. Baker (Bell Labs); Mr. Leo Cherne (Research Institute of America); Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. (TRW); Mr. Robert W. Galvin (Motorola); Mr. Gordon Gray; Dr. Edward Land (Polaroid); Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce; Dr. Edward Teller (University of California); Mr. George P. Shultz (Bechtel). Vice President Rockefeller was a member of the Board until he assumed his present office. Its purpose is to strengthen the collection, evaluation, production and timely dissemination of reliable intelligence by both military and civilian Government agencies and to assure the President of the quality, responsiveness and reliability of intelligence provided to policy-making personnel. The Board operates under a very broad charter which directs it to review all

significant aspects of foreign intelligence and related activities in which the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the Intelligence Community are engaged. It reports periodically to the President and makes appropriate recommendations.

THE BUDGET PROCESS

The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) is formulated on the basis of substantive and fiscal guidance provided by the President, through the Office of Management and Budget. The individual intelligence program budgets which make up the NFIP are developed in accordance with the same guidelines applicable to other Government agency programs -- Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11, "Preparation and Submission of Budget Estimates."

Program plans are developed and reviewed by each agency of the Intelligence Community during the spring and early summer to ensure that the general scope, size, and direction of the plan are in accordance with the objectives and priorities contained in the overall guidance. These plans are reviewed and approved at the various levels of the member agencies up to the head. They then form the basis against which detailed budget estimates are developed and submitted to the Office of Management and Budget in the fall.

These budget requests are then reviewed in detail by the Office of Management and Budget; by my Intelligence Community Staff; by the

Staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence); and by the Comptrollers of Defense and CIA. Based on these reviews, the approved budget requests for the individual intelligence programs are included within their parent department and agency budgets and form an integral part of the President's overall Federal budget. After consulting with the member agencies, I then provide to the President my independent assessment of the Intelligence Community resource requests, along with my overall recommendations for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

My annual recommendations do not constitute a budget in the traditional sense, as I have statutory authority for only the CIA. Rather, in accordance with the President's 5 November 1971 Directive, these recommendations represent my view as to the appropriate substantive focus and allocation of resources for the U. S. intelligence effort during the coming five-year period. The DCI has presented three such sets of consolidated Community program recommendations to the President and the Congress -- for Fiscal Years 1974, 1975, and 1976.

Once the National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendations are submitted (in early December), they are considered by the President. I then defend the Community's portion of the President's budget before the Congress, in addition to CIA's, as outlined above.

The National Foreign Intelligence Program is contained in about twenty Department of Defense appropriation accounts and one Department of State appropriation account; all of which require annual appropriation by Congressional appropriations committees. Of these, about half require annual authorization, which falls under the purview of the Armed Services Committees. I have also participated in these reviews, speaking for the Community.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

President Nixon's memorandum of 5 November 1971 was reaffirmed by President Ford's memorandum of 9 October 1974. The President's guidance and direction, enunciated in his 5 November 1971 memorandum, were incorporated into NSC Intelligence Directives (NSCID's) in an extensive update and revision of NSCID 1 (Basic Duties and Responsibilities); all other NSCID's were also reexamined, and the entire set was reissued on 17 February 1972. These NSCID's are supplemented by Director of Central Intelligence Directives, or DCID's, issued after consultation with the Community members, which specify in greater detail the policies and procedures established by the NSCID's. Each agency then develops its internal regulations in conformity with these policies. In addition to creating the NSC Intelligence Committee, the 1971 memorandum directed the creation of an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC).

This Committee, chaired by the DCI, consists of senior representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of Management and Budget. The DCI, since IRAC's inception, has invited the Director, NSA and the Director, DIA to participate regularly in the IRAC as observers in their capacity as National Intelligence Program Managers. A representative of the NSC staff also participates regularly as an observer. Other Community Program Managers are invited as appropriate.

The IRAC meets approximately once each quarter, except at the end of the calendar year, when more frequent meetings are needed to formulate the annual budget.

The principal role of IRAC is to advise the DCI on (1) the allocation and use of intelligence resources and (2) the formulation of the DCI's National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendations to the President.

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) is responsible for providing advice to the DCI on matters of substantive intelligence. It is designed to assist him in the production of national intelligence, establishing requirements and setting priorities, supervising dissemination and security of intelligence, and protecting intelligence sources and methods.

The Board is chaired by the DCI and meets weekly. Members include the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Vice Chairman); Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Director, NSA; Director, DIA; and representatives of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, FBI, and the Administrator, Energy Research and Development Administration. The intelligence chiefs of the military services have observer status on USIB and participate in its meetings.

USIB is supported by fourteen subordinate committees, organized along functional lines and drawing upon all elements of the Intelligence Community for membership. These committees also serve IRAC as required.

To assist in assuming the more comprehensive management of the Intelligence Community called for in the 5 November 1971 memorandum, the President directed that the DCI strengthen his personal staff. This has led to the formation of two groups: the National Intelligence Officer structure and the Intelligence Community Staff.

THE NIO STRUCTURE

The National Intelligence Officers were established in October 1973, replacing the Board of National Estimates. The group is headed by a deputy to the DCI for NIO's. Each National Intelligence Officer has a specific area of geographic or functional responsibility for which he or she

is responsible. Each NIO's raison d'etre is to provide substantive expertise to support me and to be responsible for insuring that the Community is doing everything it can to meet consumer needs. The NIO staff has been kept deliberately austere -- each NIO is limited to an assistant and a secretary -- on the philosophy that it is the NIO's job to stimulate the Community to produce the intelligence, not to do it himself. There are presently eleven NIO's dealing with subjects as diverse as strategic forces, the Mid-East, and international economics and energy. The NIO's identify the key intelligence questions needing action in their area, review and develop our collection and production strategy, ensure that our intelligence is responsive to our customers' needs, and evaluate how well we are performing against our objectives.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

The IC Staff provides management and evaluation support to the DCI. It is headed by an active duty military officer at the three-star level and is a composite of individuals drawn from CIA, NSA, DIA, active duty military (from all services), and private industry. It is organized into three main divisions: Management, Planning and Resources Review; Product Review; and Collection and Processing Assessment. The titles are descriptive of the functions performed.

MANAGEMENT VEHICLES

Since I do not exercise command authority over the component organizations of the Intelligence Community (other than the CIA), I rely on a family of management devices to provide guidance, stimulate the proper program direction and balance, and provide a basis for evaluation.

Each year, I issue Perspectives for Intelligence, a document intended to provide a broad framework to guide program development over the next five years. Perspectives provide the Community with my views of the environment within which the Community must prepare to operate. It attempts to identify, in broad terms, where the heaviest demands on the Community will come from.

I have also asked that the three major collection programs develop plans to portray the direction each is taking over the next five years and to serve to identify major strengths and weaknesses.

Each year, following a very extensive and detailed program development and review cycle, I submit to the President my National Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendations. Because of the large concentration of Community resources within the Defense Department (about 80%), the process leading up to the NFIPR is dovetailed carefully with the Defense Planning, Programming and Budgeting Process. This document

provides the President with an independent view of the national intelligence aspects of the budget he submits to the Congress. The NFIPR is prepared by the IC Staff working closely with all members of the Community.

Each year I also issue a set of National Intelligence Objectives and submit them for NSCIC approval. At the end of the year, I submit an annual report to the President on Community performance against these objectives.

These are supplemented by Key Intelligence Questions issued by me after consultation with the USIB and the NIO's. These focus the national intelligence effort on the main problems the nation faces in the world.

This extensive management structure focuses, of course, on the objectives and programs of the Intelligence Community. It also provides a process for evaluation of the effectiveness of the Community on a regular basis. The detailed financial auditing and controls are conducted within the member agencies of the Community, however, according to their specific departmental regulations. On Wednesday, I will discuss this in some detail with respect to CIA. The other members of the Community have extensive audit and review structures, which will be addressed tomorrow by Dr. Hall, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and by other agencies as they appear before you.

You are interested, I know, Mr. Chairman, in what this process produces in terms of budgets. I am also interested in showing you what it produces in terms of results -- the best intelligence in the world. As an introduction to these subjects, I would like to illustrate the intelligence problem our country faces. We live in a free society, which means that much of the information about our society is freely available. This chart shows rather graphically, I believe, the comparison between the kinds of material which are freely available in our society but which are carefully controlled in the Soviet Union. We have some controlled information also, and I believe we must have. But the availability of full and accurate information available about our country should not lead us to think that the world follows our example. For instance, it is clear that Tass produces only what the leadership wants it to produce. Radio Moscow says and shows only what is selected, and Soviet books, magazines and technical journals reveal only what has been approved. Our intelligence budget is how we overcome this difference in the availability of information. We read what is made available, but we must learn more than that if we are to protect our country.

This chart gives a conceptual representation of our problem. It compares the availability of open information about U. S. and Soviet weapons systems during the different stages of their development and

deployment. As you can see, the U. S. process is not entirely revealed, but a large amount is reflected in our technical journals, in our Congressional hearings and debates, and in the press at large. On the Soviet side, much of the basic research is published and included in scientific exchanges. Applied research, however, and the subsequent stages of test, development and deployment are conducted with only a slight degree of visibility.

This chart, again conceptual rather than specific, shows what this means in intelligence budgets, how much must be spent by each nation to learn what it must know about the other. Because of the free availability of much of our information, small expenditures are needed on the Soviet side, and their major expenditures are thus placed on the tactical coverage of the possible use and disposition of our weapons systems. This is reflected in their extensive use of signals intercept ships and their other ways of closely following the tactical movements of our forces. On our side, however, we must commit the substantial budgets I will discuss with you, to be able to determine the subjects of their applied research, the characteristics of the weapons systems being developed, and their production and deployment rates. Without these funds, we

would be unaware of many of these steps. We could face the surprise with which the world received the news of the first Sputnik. We could be years behind in the development of appropriate countermeasures to a new weapons system. We would have large areas of uncertainty about Soviet forces which could argue for excessive U. S. defense expenditures as insurance. Most of all, we would be unable to negotiate, agree upon and monitor limits on such systems such as SALT to bring about a more stable world.

In this investigation, Mr. Chairman, you will discover the revolutionary advances which have been made in our technical, analytical and operational intelligence activities by the member agencies of the American Intelligence Community. I believe you will find these investments necessary to our country, their products of great value, and the budgets carefully managed and proper.

Now, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the specific figures of the Community budget, I regret that I must ask you to go into executive session for this aspect of my testimony.

On July 25th, at your request, you were briefed with respect to the budget of the Intelligence Community in general and that of the CIA in

particular. I would be pleased to give a similar briefing to all members of the Committee and answer any questions they may have. I respectfully request, however, that such testimony be given in executive session.

In making this request, I am mindful of the need for the Intelligence Community to win the confidence of the American people, and I am aware that a request to present a portion of my testimony "behind closed doors" appears to run counter to such an objective. Nonetheless, I believe the request is in conformity with the Constitution, the laws, and the long-established Congressional procedures. I also believe it proper and just.

As you know, I am bound by law to protect the foreign intelligence sources and methods of this nation.[1] I am, like the members of this Committee, bound by my oath of office and by my own conscience to carry out the duties assigned to me -- including that one -- as fully and effectively as possible. The issue of whether the budget should remain secret is a fair one for debate, and I welcome this opportunity to be heard on it.

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[1] 50 U.S.C.A. §403(d)(3), §403(g); 18 U.S.C.A. §798; E.O. 11652, March 10, 1972.

It is clear from the legislative history of CIA's enabling legislation that the Congresses of the post-World War II period believed that the financial transactions related to intelligence simply had to remain outside of public gaze. Subsequent Congresses have consistently reaffirmed that position over the years -- most recently in the Senate last June, when a proposed amendment requiring release of an annual budget figure for intelligence was rejected by a vote of 55 to 33. Both Houses of Congress also have adopted internal rules designed to provide for a combination of detailed Congressional oversight of Agency activities and maximum protection of sensitive information about Agency operations.

Existing laws and procedures are a focal point of your current investigations and hearings. When this Committee and the Senate Select Committee complete their proceedings and submit their recommendations, the Congress may decide to change the ground rules under which we operate. If that happens, we will of course conform. But I must testify that I believe that the Agency's budget must be kept secret and that revealing it would inevitably weaken our intelligence.

Many have contended that the secrecy of the Agency budget is in conflict with Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7, of the Constitution, which states that " No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time."[2]

In fact, that very clause of the Constitution was settled on after debates in the Constitutional Convention that are part of another, less widely understood American practice -- that concealment of certain expenditures can be in the public interest. The so-called "Statement and Account" clause just quoted was not part of the initial draft. The language first suggested by George Mason would have required an annual account of public expenditures. James Madison, however, argued for making a change to require reporting "from time to time." Madison explained that the intent of his amendment was to "leave enough to the discretion of the Legislature." Patrick Henry opposed the Madison

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[2] As noted by the Supreme Court in U. S. v. Richardson, ___U. S. __, 41 L. Ed. 678, (1974), "Congress has taken notice of the need of the public for more information concerning governmental operations but at the same time it has continued traditional restraints on disclosure of confidential information. See: Freedom of Information Act, 5USC §552; Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73 (1973)" at 687.

language because it made concealment possible. But when the debate was over, it was the Madison view that prevailed. And the ability of the drafters of the Constitution to envisage a need for concealment is further indicated by Article 1, Section 5, Clause 3: "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings and from time to time publish the same, except such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy."

The option of confidential expenditures was given to Congress; it was first exercised at the request of President Washington, who in his first annual message sought a special fund for intelligence activites. Congress agreed and provided for expenditures from the fund to be recorded in the "private journals" of the Treasury. A later Congress passed a secret appropriation act providing necessary funds to enable President Madison to take possession of parts of Florida. President Polk used secret funds to send "ministers" to Central America to gather information. Many aspects of budgets have been kept confidential throughout our history and intelligence activities have consistently received special treatment. In this respect, they are similar to other well-established American secrets -- of the ballot box, of grand jury proceedings, of diplomatic negotiations, and many more. If secrecy is required to enable an important process to work, we Americans accept it. Intelligence is such a process -- it is important to our country, and it will not work if it is exposed.

Confidentiality about information having to do with intelligence organizations and their activities is a world-wide practice. A check on our part has not turned up even one example of a government that publishes its intelligence budget. There are intelligence organizations in Western democracies that are not in any way accountable to their legislatures. Indeed two newspaper editors were jailed in Sweden a couple of years ago for publishing the fact that Sweden has an intelligence service and that it had relations with the United States.

I do not refer to these foreign examples to urge that we copy them. We Americans want a responsible American intelligence service. Thus, CIA's practice is far different from the foreign examples. Our relationships with the Hill have been close over the years and oversight is far more extensive than may be realized. As the 94th Congress has organized itself, four subcommittees with a total of 38 members have oversight responsibilities for CIA. Under existing guidelines, operational activities are reported solely to them (except that, pursuant to PL 93-559, ongoing covert actions are also reported to the two foreign relations committees). I hold no matters secret from the oversight committees; instead, I have and exercise a responsibility to volunteer to them matters of possible interest. On substantive intelligence questions, I appear before many committees -- notably those dealing with military and foreign affairs, atomic energy, and space.

In the first seven months of this year, I appeared personally before Congressional Committees some 39 times. So far as the Agency budget alone is concerned, I have made two presentations to the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee and one each to the Congressionally designated subcommittee of the House Armed Services, Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations Committees. Additionally, I reported to them on the Community budget. And my formal budget appearances are only the most prominent part of the fiscal exchange. I frequently answer questions on the budget during appearances on other matters. A very large number of my subordinates brief Congressional bodies on various aspects of their activities. In connection with appropriations processes, we have so far provided written answers to well over a hundred Congressional questions on the FY 1976 budget for the Agency.

My emphasis on the worldwide and American practice of treating intelligence budgets as secret is not an argument for concealing the CIA budget from a strong oversight mechanism. This I have welcomed on many occasions, as I believe it an important element of the responsible intelligence service we Americans must have. The better the external supervision of CIA, the better its internal management will be, to the benefit of all Americans.

Instead, the need for a secret budget reflects the widespread conviction on the part of intelligence professionals, grounded in their intelligence experience, that public revelation of fiscal information would inevitably hurt our intelligence effort. The publication of a total budget figure for a single year, without more, might not be thought to be a calamity. But limiting the public record in that way is not practical. The precedent would be established under which we would at the very least have to reveal a budget total each year. A trend line would be established, and a not-so-hypothetical intelligence analyst in another country would have something to work with. And there are intelligence analysis techniques that could easily be applied to such data.

Look at this problem as we in intelligence look at foreign problems. For example, the Chinese have not published the value of their industrial production since 1960. But they have published percentage increases for some years without specifying the base, both for the nation and most of the provinces. It took one key figure to make these pieces useful: when the Chinese reported that the value of industrial production in 1971 was 21 times that of 1949, we could derive an absolute figure for 1971. With this benchmark, we could reconstruct time series both nationally and province by province. If we begin releasing intelligence budget figures, others will be able to take scraps of information about the Agency and

generally known financial trends such as inflation, and use a similar kind of analysis to draw conclusions or even identify hypotheses that would put some of our operations in jeopardy.

For example, let us look at the development of the U-2. Our budget increased significantly during the development phase of that aircraft. That fact, if public, would have attracted attention abroad to the fact that something new and obviously major was in process. If it had been supplemented by knowledge (available perhaps from technical magazines, industry rumor, or advanced espionage techniques) that funds were being committed to a major aircraft manufacturer and to a manufacturer of sophisticated mapping cameras, the correct conclusion would have been simple to draw. The U. S. manufacturers in question, their employees and their suppliers and subcontractors would have become high priority intelligence targets for foreign espionage. And I have no doubt that the Soviets would have taken early steps to acquire a capability to destroy very-high-altitude aircraft -- steps they did indeed take, with eventual success, but only some time after the aircraft began operating over their territory -- that is, once they had knowledge of a U. S. intelligence project.

Moreover, once the budget total was revealed, the demand for details probably would grow. What does it include? What does it exclude? Why did it go up? Why did it go down? Is it worth it? How does it work?

There would be revelations -- even revelations of facts not in themselves particularly sensitive but which would gradually reduce the unknown to a smaller and smaller part of the total, permitting foreign intelligence services to concentrate their efforts in the areas where we would least like to attract their attention. We -- and I specifically mean in this instance both intelligence professionals and Members of Congress -- would have an acute problem when the matter of our budget arose on the floor of the House or Senate. Those who knew the facts would have two unpleasant choices -- to remain silent in the face of all questions and allegations, however inaccurate, or to attempt to keep the debate on accurate grounds by at least hinting at the full story.

My concern that one revelation will lead to another is based on more than a "feeling." The atomic weapons budget was considered very sensitive, and the Manhattan project was concealed completely during World War II. With the establishment of the AEC, however, a decision was made to include in the 1947 budget a one-line entry for the weapons account. That limitation was short-lived. By 1974, a 15-page breakout and discussion of the atomic weapons program was being published. Were the intelligence budget to undergo a similar experience, major aspects of our intelligence strategy, capabilities and successes would be revealed. The obvious result would be a tightening of security practices by hostile, secretive, closed

foreign nations to deprive us of the knowledge we would otherwise obtain about their plans and capabilities to hurt us and our allies.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I have tried to view this question dispassionately, as both an American and an intelligence official. I would like to be able to tell the American people about our activities. There is a great deal about the best intelligence service in the world we would be proud to tell, to bring into perspective what we have had to say recently about the missteps or misdeeds in our past. I am a long way from being an advocate of secrecy for the sake of secrecy; we have deliberately opened as much of our intelligence effort for public inspection as we can -- during this past year, for example, we have briefed and answered the questions of some 10,000 members of our public, from community leaders to the press to visiting high school groups.

But I do not believe that there is any Constitutional or legal requirement that our budget be publicly revealed. Doing so would inevitably hurt our intelligence product. It is reviewed privately in depth and in detail in the Executive Branch and in the appropriate Committees of the Congress. Knowledge of the Agency budget would not enable the public to make a judgment on the appropriateness of the amount without the knowledge of the product and the ways it is obtained. And such exposure to our citizens could not be kept from potential foreign foes, who, thus alerted, would

prevent us from obtaining the intelligence we need to protect ourselves in the world today. We have lost intelligence opportunities through exposure already. I believe it is my job under the statute to prevent this, so I urge that our intelligence budgets be kept secret and be discussed by this Committee only in executive session.

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ON POLITICAL & ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

in U.S.

	FREE	CONTROLLED
Newspapers	X	
Wire Services	X	
Radio-Television	X	
Journals & Magazines	X	
Books	X	
Government Publications	X	
Economic Info. Services	X	
Congressional Hearings	X	
Professional & Cultural Exchanges	X	X
International Organizations & Negotiations	X	X
Government Exchanges	X	X

in U.S.S.R.

	FREE	CONTROLLED
TASS		X
Radio (FBIS Monitored)		X
Books		X
Magazines		X
Newspapers		X
International Commerce		X
Professional & Cultural Exchanges		X
International Organizations & Negotiations		X
Government Exchanges		X

US/USSR Weapons System Evolution

COST TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION



US/USSR Weapons System Evolution

AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION



Both Sides of Debate

NEW LAW TO GUARD NATIONAL SECRETS?

"Leakage of Secrets Poses a Great Danger"

USN&WR

Interview With William E. Colby

Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Q. Mr. Colby, in your view, is a new law needed to protect official secrets in this country?

A. Yes. We need a new law because the present legislation is inadequate to protect our intelligence activities. The present law applies essentially only to people who turn secrets over to a foreign power with intent to injure the United States. It does not apply to employes or former employes of the Central Intelligence Agency who deliberately leak to the press the names of intelligence agents or information concerning some very sensitive technical system that we operate.

Q. Is that a serious problem for you?

A. Yes. A former CIA official is publishing a book here that names every individual, foreign and American, with whom he worked while he was employed by the Agency. He obviously includes in that list the names of many of our officers, many people who worked with us in foreign intelligence services, and many private foreign citizens who worked with us at various times. As a result, some of these people have been exposed to possible legal action in their own countries. Others have been exposed to terrorist action.

Q. And there's nothing you can do about it?

A. The CIA attorneys tell me there's practically nothing I can do about it—certainly nothing as far as criminal prosecution is concerned—even though all of us at the Agency signed secrecy agreements as a condition of employment and as a condition of getting access to sensitive material.

Unlike a number of other Government departments, there is no law which the Justice Department may utilize to bring criminal proceedings against an employe or former employe of the CIA who merely reveals our sensitive material.

Q. Do you mean that the CIA has even less power to protect secrets than ordinary Government departments?

A. Very much so. An Internal Revenue Service employe who reveals your income-tax return without proper authorization can be prosecuted. A member of the Department of Agriculture who releases cotton statistics to some friend is guilty of a crime. A member of the Census Bureau who reveals an individual census return commits a crime.

Q. The CIA has been operating for 28 years. Why has this problem suddenly become so acute as to require a new law?

A. The main reason stems from the various investigations

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"We Already Have More Protection Than We Need"



USN&WR

Interview With Senator Alan Cranston

Democrat, Of California

Q. Senator Cranston, why are you opposed to a new law that would provide additional protection for official secrets?

A. I believe that we already have more protection for official secrets than we need. My main concern is that classification of information by the Government is out of control. Too many different people have authority to classify—and they often do it with excessive zeal to protect themselves and people higher up. They often seem more interested in job security than in national security. Not long ago someone with direct experience testified that more than 99 per cent of classified material should not be treated that way.

We would open up a very dangerous situation if we started to write laws that anybody who transmits or receives any classified information without proper authority is guilty of a crime.

Q. What should be done to protect Government agencies against wholesale leaking of secret documents?

A. I'm more concerned about the need for protecting reporters and the free flow of information to the public than I am about the need for protecting Government agencies. I think that we need a shield law to exempt reporters from prosecution for refusing to reveal their sources.

A great deal of the information that the American public gets about what its Government is up to does not come out in formal press releases. It comes from digging by the press and from leaks by officials who think the Government is doing improper things. If you close that off, you would threaten the free press and the ability of the people in this democracy to know what is going on.

Q. Do you consider the leaking of official secrets desirable?

A. Yes—if the official secret is information that the Government is improperly hiding from the public and which the public has a right to know. That is a very important part of democracy.

A free press is an essential restraint on government; it is basic to our constitutional concept of a government of limited powers. I think the Founding Fathers had a very acute understanding of that when they wrote the First Amendment. They were more concerned about protecting people against the abuses of government than enabling the government to do things for people—or to people.

(continued on next page)

Interview With CIA Director Colby

[continued from preceding page]

now going on. In these investigations we are taking an overall look at our intelligence system in order to update the old image. In the process, the amount of leakage of sensitive secrets poses a great danger to running an effective intelligence service in the future.

Q. In what way have these leaks damaged your intelligence operations?

A A number of countermeasures have been taken by other countries because they learned of certain activities of ours. These countries have been able to frustrate our continued access to that particular form of information.

We're in a situation where we are losing agents. There's no question about it. And I am sure there are situations in which a number of foreign intelligence agencies have considered whether to give us a particularly delicate item, and they've said: "Well, these days, no. It might leak." We are developing a reputation in other intelligence services of not being able to keep secrets in this country.

Q. Isn't there a danger that a new law to protect intelligence secrets might be used to cover wrongdoings by CIA?

A I think we are going to eliminate the potential of cover-ups in several ways as a result of the investigations now going on. Looking ahead, I think we are going to have clearer lines of direction of the CIA and much better supervision within the executive branch and by Congress. The better the external supervision, the better the internal supervision. This will tighten up everything and would prevent the use of new legislation for anything other than a good reason.

Moreover, I think we've had a rather rich lesson in the last couple of years of the dangers of trying to cover things up. In a big Government bureaucracy you really can't cover up, because somebody always writes a memorandum or leaves the service and tells about it, and an enterprising reporter finds out about it.

Q. Who would determine what are real intelligence secrets that require legal protection—the CIA itself?

A No. I would have no problem in demonstrating to a judge in chambers, if necessary, that any case brought under a new law involved a sensitive intelligence matter and was not an arbitrary or capricious prosecution. Only after a judge had established that fact would the case go to trial—in public. That would determine whether the defendant was guilty of communicating the secrets illegally. The secrets themselves would not be exposed in open court.

EXEMPTING PRESS FROM PROSECUTION—

Q. In your view, should the press be held liable for publishing intelligence secrets?

A I don't believe that I should be able to prosecute a newsman who picks up something and then publishes it, and the new law I proposed would prohibit such a prosecution. I do think the individual within the system who gave it to him should be punished, however. I am not in favor of the sort of Official Secrets Act that Great Britain has, which makes it a crime for anyone to release secrets—whether officials or newsmen.

Q. What are your chances of getting the kind of legislation that you advocate to protect secrets?

A Well, if I were asking for this legislation on my own and in isolation, I admit the chances would not be good in the present climate. But in the process of taking a fresh look at our intelligence structure as a whole, we Americans cannot responsibly consider how to run an intelligence organization without resolving this problem of how to keep a few American secrets.

Interview With Senator Cranston

[continued from preceding page]

Of course, there are areas where I am very strongly opposed to the revelation of classified information. But I want to be certain that the information is properly classified.

Q. How would you do that?

A Well, it's necessary to define very precisely the categories of information that are really vital defense secrets. In my opinion, these would be limited to cryptographic information, plans for military-combat operations, information regarding the actual method of operation of certain weapons systems, and restricted atomic data. The disclosure of information in these categories obviously would be very damaging to the United States and should be against the law.

There are other areas of information involving national defense where disclosure would not necessarily be damaging—for example, cost overruns on weapons development. I think it would be proper for somebody to blow the whistle on that if he were aware of abuses. In this category of information, we need the tightest possible definition of what can be classified as secret. Also, we must take into account the intent of anyone who reveals this sort of information.

I am absolutely opposed to any catchall phrase—like national security—to cover information that should be classified as secret. We've learned in the Watergate and other scandals that the term "national security" is subject to the broadest possible stretching to cover up wrongdoings.

"CIA HAS HAD TOO MUCH POWER"—

Q. What about the CIA? Is additional legislation needed to prevent officials or former officials of that Agency from revealing names of agents and similar secrets?

A The CIA should have adequate protection, but we have to think out very thoroughly precisely what that protection should be. I think the naming of agents is improper. But if an agent acts in violation of the law, that's something else again. In a case of that sort, it's a matter of individual judgment whether or not it should be made public.

Basically, it's my view that the CIA has had too much power—and this has led to a lot of abuse. You can't really draw a distinction between the use of power by the CIA to protect sensitive information and the use of that same power to do almost anything they choose and then cover it up. We certainly need more control over the intelligence agencies—and that control must include a greater ability by Congress to decide what should and should not be classified as secret.

Q. The news media have revealed a number of intelligence operations—such as the salvaging of a sunken Russian submarine and interception of telephone conversations between Soviet leaders and the Kremlin. Should the press be liable for compromising such espionage operations?

A No. I would leave the decision whether or not to publish to the professional judgment of the press. I don't think that you can start writing definitions of information that it is illegal for the press to publish, without making governmental restrictions on the availability of information subject to vast abuses.

Q. Is it possible to operate an effective intelligence organization in this country in those circumstances?

A Yes. We obviously need an intelligence community, but we don't want to subvert what we are supposed to be protecting—which is our fundamental democracy—by giving Government agents power that is too sweeping.

Basically, I believe that because Government is getting bigger and bigger and ever more powerful, we have to be very much on guard against giving it authority and secret power without proper, constitutional restraints.

NEWSDAY
13 JUNE 1975

CIA Behind the Cloak, A Placid Wooded Headquarters

On the surface are charges of assassination plots and illegal deeds. But underneath, there is an everyday human side.

By Jane Morse
Newsday Staff Correspondent

Until quite recently, one of the few provable facts known about the cloaked and secretive Central Intelligence Agency is that its headquarters are in Langley, Va., just outside Washington. Current probes of the organization suggest, however, that it may be a way out, and that anything at all could be going on there.

Indeed it is.

Although the knitting and crocheting club has adjourned for the summer, the 60-voice chorus continues to hold once-a-week practice sessions, the grand slam bridge club has regular duplicate games every Tuesday at 6:15 and the Bible study class gets together twice a week at midday.

The fact is that behind the shadowy, faceless spy facade and in the midst of recent revelations and investigations, there exists a not-so-faceless bunch of individuals linked by federal-style bureaucracy that's complete with a hyperactive employee activities association, a private washroom for the director, a credit union and a car pool. It has, as well, carved-in-marble a testimonial to honor 31 of its people killed in the line of duty, a clinic set up with the specialized equipment needed for the prompt treatment of heart attack victims (something that's required with startling regularity it is said), and a "helping hand" fund that takes up voluntary, anonymous collections to help staff members in need.

Nonetheless, these days, anyone who veers off the highway after the sign that says "CIA Next Right" is apt to cause other drivers and passengers to risk dislocating their vertabrae twisting for a look. It's hardly a wonder, of course. The place has never been on the Gray Line tour and there are relatively few people, outside the staff and its professional associates, who have ever been inside.



A CIA employee consults the agency's large collection of foreign newspapers. This and the pictures that follow were all released by the CIA.

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• The rare visiting outsider would find that what's inside is a magnificently wooded, 213.1-acre campus —and campus is what it's called. Like most campuses it's a little short on parking, but that's partly because Allen Dulles, who was the agency director when the new headquarters were built, had strong feelings about trees.

"He'd say, 'Gee, that's a beautiful tree,' and tie something around it to mark it for saving, even if it had to be moved. I figure he cost us something like 250 parking spaces," an associate recalls.

Dulles hired the architectural firms of Harrison and Abramowitz and Frederic R. King, reportedly outmaneuvering the General Services Administration, which had some other ideas. The seven-story, off-white, reinforced-concrete building that resulted was completed in 1961—and promptly infiltrated. Field mice moved in almost at once.

Present-day two-legged infiltrators might get by the guards at the toll-booth-like main entrance gate (they seem to be accustomed to unannounced visitors arriving to pick up and haul away passengers) but to park or to get more than 20 yards inside the front door, you need papers. If you're expected, guards—behind signs warning that such things as cameras, firearms and incendiary devices are prohibited—will point you toward a reception room stocked with magazines and pay phones. There, one of three receptionists will smilingly offer a visitor's form to be filled out in duplicate.

Once you receive the seal of approval (a clip-on card saying "Visitor"), it's entirely possible that you might even get inside someplace as exotic as the self-service postal center. It will happen, though, only if the person whom you're meeting or the escort who's assigned to you is agreeable. From the reception room on, you *must* have company.

The building is roughly a quadrangle. In the center is an enclosed patio that you'd pass if headed for the "open" cafeteria or the Muzak-free but cocktail-lounge-like Rendezvous Room. Alcohol, though, does not cross the border of any government food service installation. The Rendezvous Room is, instead, noted for its $2.20 daily all-you-can-eat buffet.

When the weather permits, numbers of employees opt for outside eating at rustic tables on the grounds beind the building. Still others patronize a second cafeteria that duplicates the first with the same vaulted ceiling and expanse of glass that, as interior decorators have established, brings the outdoors in. The latter cafeteria, though, lets in *only* the outdoors and certain well-cleared CIA employees.

Some of the same employees were no doubt involved—in a successful 1962 coup that resulted in the elimination of the building's thoroughly depressing all-gray corridors. Designers were rushed in and finally agreed on white walls punctuated by colored doors and panels, each shaded to follow the other like spokes in a color wheel.

The new look was a hit with most employees, although one senior official is supposed to have commented that it brought to his mind the story of a visitor shown around the home of a newly rich woman. "Madam," the visitor said, "I'll pay for the drinks but I won't go upstairs."

Upstairs, one hears, there are still some problems with personal clutter. Personal clutter is "the enemy of good design," according to a 7-page booklet, and employees are admonished that they may be aiding the opposition when they tape cartoons to their office safes or pile junk on top of them.

The CIA has won the design-clutter war on the first floor, though, and in style. Bright contemporary paintings borrowed from Washington art collector Vincent Melzac are positioned effectively on various walls, and an Exhibit Hall in the southeast area is currently displaying near eastern and Indo-Pakistani art objects from the private collections of CIA employees. The agency's own fine arts commission is at the moment being chewed out by in-house critics for putting phony grass beneath the magnolia trees in a small patio off the cafeteria area, but it has been lauded for other moves. It gave its approval, for instance, to "wrapping" the four main banks of elevators in floor-to-ceiling blow-ups of antique maps, one of Rome, one of Paris, one of London and one of St. Petersburg in Czarist Russia.

The elevator interiors fell into waggish hands, and, although standard "no smoking" signs are carefully posted, they're in such not-so-standard languages as Japanese, Persian, Hindi and Hausa, as well as French and German. If a Chinese-speaking spy ever penetrates the place, he probably would feel most at home using the stairs, since floors are numbered in various Asian and foreign numerals.

He should not, however, bet any money on getting that far.

Anywhere on "campus," you can tell the regulars from the drop-in trade at a glance. The regulars have their pictures on thier ID cards and seem to favor hanging them on chains around their necks. They're also the ones who *don't* stop to gawk at the portraits of former CIA directors that are spaced out along one of the first-floor corridors. Or at the framed display of CIA medals, some of which have to be stashed on the premises until they're not too hot to be handled by recipients whose cover or operation might be blown if they took delivery. Or at the copy of George Washington's letter articulating his own strong feelings of the necessity of intelligence gathering and the need to keep it secret.

It's hard, of course, for a newcomer not to stop and stare. What the CIA may really be running is a mini-museum with research facilities.

Even inside the library are more artifacts and memorabilia. For one thing, there's the big wooden seal that identified the agency's old headquarters in midtown Washington. It was saved in an informal Sunday morning salvage operation performed by a thoughtful history-minded staff member.

There's also the historical intelligence collection of some 20,000 "tradecraft" books frequently consulted by intelligence officers in search of a precedent. The library's main collection is now primarily a body of about 75,000 reference books plus a worldwide selection of telephone directories and enough newspapers to provide the English with a few centuries worth of fish-and-chip wrappings.

To keep further abreast of current events and thinking, the CIA training office, from time to time, invites guests such as missile man Wernher von Braun, author-editor-educator Irving Kristol, Marquette University Journalism School Dean George Reedy and former Strategic Arms Limitation Talks negotiator Paul Nitze to speak before employees in a bubble-domed 500-seat auditorium attached to the main building. Keeping up also means that the Northern Virginia Community Col-

continued

e sends over instructors to hold regular after-rk-hour classes in a variety of subjects.

That last move, though, seems like a coals-to-Newcastle waste of effort. As one of the resident ellectuals puts it, if the CIA closed down tomor-v as a spy operation, it could reopen the follow-ing day as one of the country's leading universities. Enough academic expertise could be rounded up the premises to set up shop immediately in erything from "A" for anthropology to "Z" for ology. For a language-studies department alone, the new university could call on people with mpetence in 97 different tongues and dialects, including the desk officer, who has achieved ternational recognition for his hobby, 16th-Century Latin. /III

n the headquarters of the Central ntelligence Agency, he stairs, at left, re decorated with oor numbers in foreign characters. uch touches are signs that despite its attered image, the CIA is in many ways very human organization.

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



The outdooor eating area where employees often have lunch in good weather



CIA Director William Colby arrives for work at the main entrance, above. The front of the CIA building is above, with the main entrance beneath the overhang at left.

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

The well-equipped employees' gym in the basement.



The letters 'HIC' stand for Historical Intelligence Collection, where the 'tradec-aft' collection is housed.

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

A blow-up of an antique map of St. Petersburg in Czarist Russia decorates an elevatior installation.



Part of information board maintained for employees.

SPOTLIGHT ON CIA

What It Is . . . What It Does

USN&WR

Interview With William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. Colby's first involvement in intelligence work was in the Office of Strategic Services in World War II. He then earned a law degree from Columbia Law School, and in 1950 joined the CIA. He served in Rome, Stockholm and Saigon, and as head of the Agency's clandestine services. He became Director of the CIA on Sept. 4, 1973. He appears, at right in photo, in the conference room of "U. S. News & World Report."

Is spying on enemies and friends, or subversion of governments, immoral? Mr. Colby was invited to visit the magazine to give editors his first comprehensive interview dealing with CIA's worldwide operations.

Q. Mr. Colby, many people around the world question the moral right of the Central Intelligence Agency to spy on friendly countries, as opposed to countries that are potential enemies of the United States. How do you answer that?

A. First, it's hard to distinguish so clearly between friends and potential enemies, as over our history a number of countries have been both. But basically the question comes down to the concept of state sovereignty and the right of a country to protect itself, which have long been recognized as part of international relations. That includes the right to carry out such operations in the world as are believed necessary for self-protection.

I think that moralists over the years have accepted some degree of clandestine work as part of the normal relationship between states. In any case, is spying any less moral than developing great weapons systems, or many of the other things that nations do in their self-interest?

Q. How do you decide whether to operate in a friendly or neutral country?

A. The decision concerning any intelligence operation is determined by the answer to four questions: What is the importance to our nation of the intelligence result being sought? What is the risk of exposure? What would be the impact of exposure? And how much does it cost?

In most open societies, you don't have to conduct clandestine operations to get information. So you would be foolish to run the risks and absorb the costs of a clandestine mission. Obviously, in a friendly country the adverse impact of exposure would be very great. So that is a very negative factor. But there will be situations in some parts of the world where a well-conceived, low-risk operation is necessary to get some information which could be terribly important to us.

Q. What about covert operations such as the one the CIA conducted in Chile before the overthrow of Allende?

A. Again, it's a matter of the United States taking a decision that a certain course of action is important in the best interests of our country, and friendly elements in another one. There have been exposures before. The U-2 [spy plane] operation, of course, is a notable example.

Q. Do you, as the Director of the CIA, decide that a covert operation, such as against Chile, should be conducted?

A. These decisions are very carefully structured. The authority for them stems from the National Security Act. This authorizes the CIA to carry out such other functions and duties related to foreign intelligence as the National Security Council may direct.

Furthermore, we explain to our congressional oversight subcommittees in general how we propose to use the funds that are appropriated annually for the CIA. We provide the most-sensitive information and have no secrets as far as these subcommittees are concerned. I don't necessarily describe each operation in each country in detail, but if a member of these subcommittees asks what we are doing in any particular country, I'll give him a full and fair picture.

Q. Who actually makes the decision that a covert operation should be undertaken?

A. The actual operation is approved by a committee of the National Security Council—the Forty Committee. If there is high-level policy concern about the situation in some country, we in CIA look at it and see what we might do that would help implement national policy. Then we go up to the National Security Council and say, "Here is what we think we can do to carry out the general policy with regard to that country." If the proposal is approved, we go ahead and carry it out.

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SPOTLIGHT ON CIA

[interview continued from preceding page]

I'm not suggesting that CIA has been pushed or shoved into undertaking actions of this sort; it's part of our job.

Q Is clandestine activity the major element in CIA activity—even in these days of détente?

A To answer that question, we have to stand back and examine what the United States intelligence "community" includes. It embraces the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the intelligence services of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the intelligence units in State, Treasury and the Atomic Energy Commission, and the FBI. All of these agencies collaborate on the intelligence job.

After all, intelligence consists essentially of the collection of information—by overt, technical and clandestine means—the assessment of all this information, and deriving conclusions and judgments about what is going on or is likely to go on in the world.

In 1971, President Nixon said that the Director of Central Intelligence should take a leadership role in this whole effort. And I've tried to do this.

Essentially I have four jobs:

One of my jobs is to be head of the intelligence community. Apart from the CIA, I don't have full authority over these other agencies, but I do have certain influence on them because of my responsibility to report on what they are doing.

A second job is running the CIA.

Third, I have to be substantively informed about situations around the world so that I can provide briefings, information and assessments to the National Security Council.

Fourth is the job of acting as a kind of public spokesman and handling problems like our recent troubles.

Now, to get back to your question: By reason of the way the community is structured, clandestine activity, most of which is clandestine collection rather than covert political or similar action, does represent a considerable percentage of CIA's activity. But if you measure it against the whole of the intelligence community, it's a rather small percentage of the total community effort.

Q Has détente changed the character of your work or reduced the need for clandestine intelligence?

A I wish it would. If you get to the logical end of détente, then we would have established a relationship with the Soviet Union of mutual respect for each other's strengths, so that our differences can be negotiated about rather than fought over. This, in turn, should encourage the Soviets to believe that they ought to be more open with their information. But that's not the situation now.

Today the Soviet attachés can go to almost any newsstand in this country, pick up a copy of a technical aviation or space magazine, and from it learn a vast amount of detail about our

AMERICA'S TOP INTELLIGENCE CHIEF

The massive flow of information pouring into Washington requires William Colby, as Director of Central Intelligence, to make constant evaluations of fresh global developments bearing on U. S. interests.

Following, in his own words, is the appraisal Mr. Colby gave editors of "U. S. News & World Report" of tensions around the world, what they mean, what they could lead to, and the possible impact on the superpowers.

USN&WR

Strategic balance: U. S. vs. Russia. "The Soviets are developing new missile systems that will increase their strategic power considerably.

"But we do not see that in the foreseeable future they can dominate us. We have both reached the point where we can destroy each other, and the rest of the world—and they know it.

"You ask if the transfer of American technology to the Soviets is a matter of concern.

"We know that the military have a very high priority in Soviet decision-making. We have procedures that put limitations on giving them things of direct military value. And they have a problem of adapting our technology, which works because of our competitive system. That is a problem they've got to do some adjusting to.

"The Soviets are, of course, well behind us technologically. But they are able to challenge us in arms competition by taking a much-more-disciplined approach, particularly in assigning their best talent to arms work. One very interesting thing is to compare the Soviet military work in space with the Soviet civilian work in space. There is an obvious qualitative difference between the two. The military work is much, much better."

Détente: Why Soviets want it. "There are three main reasons for Soviet interest in promoting détente with the United States.

"First, they obviously want to prevent the kind of horrendous confrontation that is possible in this age of superweapons. The result of a nuclear exchange between us would be just so incredible now that they realize that something has to be done to avoid it.

"Secondly, they insist that they be recognized as one of the world's two superpowers and get the status that their strength implies. They might also benefit from a relaxation of the Western solidarity that characterized the 1950s and 1960s.

"Thirdly, they would like to accelerate their development in economic and technical terms, because as they look at the enormous power of the West—America particularly, but also the other countries—they see it moving at a tremendous rate. They hope to benefit by a greater degree of exchange and borrowing from that movement.

"Generally, the Soviet concern over their internal discipline is very high. This is partly a result of détente. They are nervous about what détente can do in terms of getting new thoughts and new political drives going within the Soviet Union. And they just don't want that to happen."

Soviet empire: Starting to crumble? "The Soviets face a problem as the states in Eastern Europe show signs of dissatisfaction over iron-fisted control from Moscow. The Russians have made it clear that they are not going to brook any substantial break in their Eastern European buffer zone.

"But, at the same time, they obviously have the problem of dealing with the new political ideas that are circulating in

weapons systems. Unfortunately, we have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to get comparable information about the Soviet Union. We couldn't fulfill our responsibilities to Congress and the nation unless we did spend those millions of dollars gathering that information.

Q. There is pressure for CIA to restrict itself to the collection of foreign intelligence such as you've described, and abandon covert operations—that is, aiming at the overthrow of governments. How do you react to that idea?

A Given the state of the world today, the Capitol would not collapse tonight if the CIA were not permitted to conduct such covert operations any longer. In fact, we do considerably less of these than we did during the worldwide confrontation with the Soviets and the expansionist drive of the Communists in the 1950s. And we do considerably less than during the period in the '60s, when we were dealing with Communist insurgency and subversion in a number of countries. Changes in the world situation and our national policies have decreased such activities. We still do some; but covert actions of this type are a very small percentage of our total effort at the moment.

Q. Why is it needed at all?

A There are a few situations where a little discreet help to a few friends of the United States or a little help to a few people espousing a certain policy or program in a foreign country can enable us to influence a local situation in a way that may avert a greater crisis in the future.

And times change. We might be faced with a real need for early, quiet influence against a rising threat, which otherwise we might have no alternative than to meet by force later. We no longer want to send the Marines to such situations. I think this flexible tool is important to preserve so that we can use it if we have to.

Q. Do you assume that undercover agents from friendly countries are operating in the United States?

A Certainly I do. The FBI has identified a number in the past.

You have to recognize that, in dealing with a lot of countries around the world, it's accepted that we all engage in the clandestine gathering of intelligence. Nobody gets emotional about it. It's been going on since Moses sent a man from each tribe to spy out the Land of Canaan.

Q. There has been some comment that budget cutbacks have hurt intelligence gathering to the point where Secretary of State Kissinger goes into talks with the Russians with inadequate information. Is there any truth in that?

A We obviously are suffering budgetary pressures from inflation. I think we are still giving a very good intelligence product to our Government. I have great confidence in it.

There have been some projects that we have turned down because they were totally out of reach financially. These have been in the category of things that would have made our intelligence more complete, but I don't think that we

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-SIZES UP WORLD'S TROUBLE SPOTS

some of those countries—including demands for greater freedom of action.

"The old idea of total Soviet dominance and control is under challenge even from some of the Communist Party leaders in Eastern Europe."

Western Europe: Communist penetration. "One thing the Soviets want is Communist participation in the governments of Western Europe.

"This is in line with Communist ideology, which says that collapse of the European democratic system is inevitable, so that the movement of Communist forces from minority voices to participation will enable the Communists eventually to take over governments there and run them.

"Obviously, the Communists are playing a role in some countries by reason of the 25 per cent or 28 per cent of the votes they represent, and the difficulties of organizing governments among the fragmented non-Communist parties.

"There's been some increase in Communist Party influence. But several trends are running: One is the increase in European Communist Party influence in these countries; another is the apparent increase in the independence of European Communist parties from Moscow's control, and another is the non-Communist parties' reaction to this, to détente, and to each other. It's premature to tell where these trend lines are going to cross.

"We are certainly not saying, 'It doesn't matter whether the Communists participate in power.' What I'm saying is that this is a complicated, multifactored matter."

Cuba: Castro's policy now. "Fidel Castro's attempts to export his brand of Communist insurgency to other countries of Latin America didn't work.

"The Cubans have stressed in recent years the development of state-to-state relationships. And they've been quite successful with that new policy.

"As for Russia, the Soviets still rate Cuba as a geographic asset—no question about it. It's a very substantial geographic asset, but it's a very costly one to them in terms of the support the Cubans have required over the years.

"Cuba's present activities in Latin America—stressing state links—are, in general, of long-term use to Soviet interests."

War in Mideast: Quite possible. "Another round of war between Israel and the Arabs is possible—quite possible.

"It depends in great part on peacemaking diplomacy. Obviously, the Arab summit meeting at Rabat, which named the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of Palestinians living on Arab land held by Israel, raises new difficulties.

"As for the Soviet role: They desire to play the role of a major power in the Middle Eastern area. They are endeavoring to express that through their naval presence, through their military-aid programs, through their economic aid, and so forth. Their policy right now is to keep that presence active, keep the capability of influencing the situation. But at the same time they have a considerable interest in continuing détente with the United States. They've got to try to go along a rather narrow track without abandoning their influence, but, on the other hand, not seeing the whole thing derail.

"The Soviets do get a certain amount of benefit from the economic troubles that afflict the West as a result of the oil problems, but they don't have to do much about that. It's taking place pretty much on its own. On the other hand, they have to realize that an aggressive move by them to cut off oil could cause a reaction on our side. It would be a very direct affront to any détente hopes that they have."

USN&WR

National Security Council in session. Mr. Colby, far left, may suggest covert operations by CIA in a country causing "high-level concern" as a way to "implement national policy." He adds: "If the proposal is approved, we carry it out. It's part of our job."

SPOTLIGHT ON CIA

[interview continued from preceding page]

have yet dropped below a danger line. I don't think it has imperiled our ability to negotiate.

However, as we look ahead a few years, we do have a problem coming up because of the inflationary squeeze. We've tried to respond to this by focusing our effort on the more-important things and dropping off the things that we may have needed in a different world.

Q. Where have you been able to cut back?

A. Luckily, today we are not required to maintain the scale of effort that we did in Southeast Asia, for example. Our problems in some of the other parts of the world are more manageable than they were when we were deeply concerned about a large number of countries that were under pressure of Communist subversion or insurgency. The impact on the world balance then could have been quite substantial if any one country had made a change in political direction.

Today, I think the world balance is a little more stable, at least with respect to major military threats to our country.

The real challenge for intelligence is to provide the kind of information that enables us to negotiate and enables us to anticipate future developments in countries that would be of great importance to us. Obviously, the subject of economics has become more important in the past few years. Terrorism has become a threat to the safety of our citizens. Also, the narcotics problem has grown in the past few years. But other situations correspondingly have declined, and we've been able to compensate.

Q. Mr. Colby, the CIA has been widely criticized for its involvement in Watergate—

A. The CIA did two wrong things in the Watergate affair: The first was providing Howard Hunt paraphernalia for use in his work for the White House. The second was providing White House employes the psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg. They weren't earthshaking, but they were wrong. We shouldn't have done them, and we have told our employes that we won't do them again.

Q. If someone called today from the White House and asked the CIA to do something improper, what could you do about it?

A. Well, that's very clear. In my confirmation hearing on July 2 last year, I said that if I was ordered to do something improper, I would object and quit if necessary. That's easy. Also our employes have been instructed that if they have any question about anything that they are asked to do, they are to come to me.

If anybody really tried to misuse the CIA in the future, I think the organization would explode from inside. It really would. And that's good, because it's the best protection we have against this kind of problem.

Q. Do you operate at all inside the United States?

A. We have no internal-security functions or police or law enforcement powers. It is clear that our function is only foreign intelligence.

What do we do inside the United States?

We have a large building up on the Potomac River with a lot of employes. In order to know something about them before we hire them, we conduct security investigations. We also make contracts with people around the country to supply us with things that we can use in our activities abroad. And we have contracts for research projects so that we can expand the base of our knowledge.

We have a service in our agency that talks to Americans who may have knowledge of some foreign situation that they are willing to share with their Government. We identify ourselves as representatives of the CIA, and we assure these Americans that they will be protected as a source—and we will do so. But we don't pay them and we don't conduct clandestine operations to obtain such intelligence from Americans.

We have some support structures in this country for our work abroad. We also collect foreign intelligence from foreigners in America. This is intelligence about foreign countries and has nothing to do with protecting the internal security of this country against those foreigners. That is the job of the FBI, with which we have a clear understanding and good co-operation as to our respective functions.

(continued on next news page)

SPOTLIGHT ON CIA

[interview continued from page 32]

Q. A number of Congressmen complain that there is no effective control over the CIA. Is there any reason why your agency shouldn't be subjected to tighter supervision?

A I think we have responded to Congress's right and desire to know about the details of our activities over the years in the form that Congress itself has arranged. Now, the arrangements we have with our oversight committees in Congress are a lot more intense today than in past years. Twenty years ago, all of this was considered a very secret affair. Today, Congress is much more demanding. We answer any questions our oversight committees ask, and I must volunteer to them matters they might not know to ask about. That's the way Congress wants it, and we are responding. If we didn't, we'd be in real trouble.

Q. Mr. Colby, do you feel that the effectiveness of the CIA is impaired by all the publicity that you've been getting lately about secret operations?

A Obviously this has raised questions among some of our foreign friends about the degree to which we can keep secrets. Leading officials of foreign governments have brought it up in discussions with me. Individuals who have worked with us in various parts of the world have indicated a disinclination to work with us any longer because of the very real dangers to them of exposure.

In that respect, we have been hurt. But I like the way our society runs. I think it is perhaps unique that the chief of intelligence has to be exposed, as he is in America. But we have a responsibility to the American people. We are as responsive as we can be and still run an intelligence service. We regularly brief newsmen on world situations, we talk publicly about our activities in general terms, and we release our information and assessments whenever we can. I think America gains a great deal of strength from this, even though it's a big change from traditional intelligence secrecy.

Q. How do leaks affect morale at the CIA?

A You have to draw a distinction between leaks that lead to criticism of our programs and policies and leaks that expose our people. I think that we can and should stand up to the criticism. But exposing our people can be very difficult and also very dangerous.

You will recall Mr. Mitrione, who was killed in Uruguay. [Dan Mitrione, a U. S. employe of the Agency for International Development assigned to train police in Uruguay, was kidnaped on July 31, 1970, and later killed by Tupamaro guerrillas.] He was murdered—that's the only word for it. He was alleged to have been a CIA officer, which he was not.

I think it is reckless to go around naming people as being identified with the CIA.

Q. Why can't you prevent former CIA officials from publishing books that reveal secrets of your agency and the names of secret agents?

A There are criminal penalties for people who reveal income-tax returns or census returns or even cotton statistics. But there are no similar criminal penalties for people who reveal the name of an intelligence officer or agent or an intelligence secret, unless they give it to a foreigner or intend to injure the United States. I think it's just plain wrong for us not to protect our secrets better.

I am charged in the National Security Act with the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. But the only tool I have is the secrecy agreement we require our people to sign as a condition of employment.

We invoked this agreement against one of our ex-employes who wrote a book. We didn't censor his opinions or criticisms; we just tried to prevent him from revealing names of people and sensitive operations, some still going on. We are currently engaged in a civil action in the courts to determine whether we can enforce the agreement he made.

I recommended legislation that would make it possible for us to protect intelligence secrets more effectively. My recommendations would apply only to those of us who voluntarily sign an agreement that gives us access to these secrets; it would not impinge on First Amendment guarantees.

WIDE WORLD

Anti-Marxists in Chile protesting policies of the late President Allende. CIA acted "in the best interests of our country, and friendly elements in another."

Q. Mr. Colby, can we get back to the question of the necessity for the United States to maintain a big, secret intelligence operation in an era of détente?

A Yes—I didn't fully reply to that.

I feel it is essential to the protection of our country, not only our military security but also in the sense of security against the other problems we face overseas—economic pressures, terrorism, local problems that can start in various parts of the world and eventually involve us. Through our intelligence work we must anticipate these problems and take protective steps. If we don't know that another country is developing a particular threat, we can be caught very badly off base.

Beyond that, our intelligence work makes it possible to engage in negotiations. The SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement between U. S. and Russia is the most obvious example. Without the knowledge we had of Soviet weapons through our intelligence activities, it would not have been possible for us to negotiate.

We also have what I would call a peacekeeping role, which

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Missile sites in Cuba photographed from U-2.
"Technology has revolutionized intelligence. . . . We can monitor the 1972 SALT agreement without on-site inspection."

SPOTLIGHT ON CIA

[interview continued from preceding page]

I see of increasing importance in the years ahead. On a number of occasions, we have seen situations developing in a dangerous manner. By alerting our Government in good time, it has been possible for it to defuse these situations.

Q. What part do spy satellites and other forms of modern technology play in your work of collecting intelligence?

A. Quite frankly, technology has revolutionized the intelligence business. You have seen the photographs that came out of the U-2 operation over Cuba. You can realize the great importance of this development if you think back to the great debate in 1960 about a missile gap. People took strong positions on both sides, and we at the CIA were trying to determine what really was happening—whether a missile gap actually was opening up in favor of the Soviet Union. Today it would be impossible to have that debate because the facts are known.

This kind of technical intelligence made the SALT agreement possible. For years we insisted that any arms agreement would require inspection teams to monitor on the ground what the Russians were doing. Given their closed society, they wouldn't permit it. That stalled negotiations for years. Finally our "national technical means," as we politely call them, were improved to the extent we could tell the President and Congress that we can monitor the 1972 SALT agreement without on-site inspection teams, and we could make the agreement.

Q. Some argue that satellites and other forms of technical intelligence can do the job and that there is no real need for clandestine agents ferreting out information. Do you agree?

A. Not at all. Technical systems and open observation can tell us a great deal of what is physically there in closed societies. But they can't tell us what is going to be there in three or four years' time because of decisions that are being made in board rooms today. They can't tell us the internal political dynamics to allow us to assess how such a society is changing. And they can't tell us the intentions of people who may be bent on deceiving us. Intelligence of this sort can be obtained only by what we call "clandestine collection."

Q. Looking at Russia's intelligence operation—the KGB—how does it compare with ours in scale and effectiveness?

A. I think Soviet intelligence is going through a change—a good change. For years the big thrust was on stealing secrets. You remember the atom spies in America and all that sort of thing. In the past few years the Soviets have apparently become aware of the significance of assessment—the analy[sis] function of intelligence. They've set up institutes to study t[he] United States, realizing that the facts are easy to obtain in America. Their real problem is assessing what we might do, which is a terribly complicated and difficult intelligen[ce] problem.

Q. Are you suggesting that the KGB no longer maintains spies in this country?

A. Oh, they do—sure, they do. What I am saying is th[at] they have moved from heavy dependence on espionage [to] greater reliance on more-normal ways of collecting and assessing intelligence. You can only say that's a change for the good; it should give them a more accurate picture of [us] and it could hopefully reduce their espionage someday.

But the Soviets still run very extensive covert operations around the world. In any kind of foreign mission they send abroad—for example, delegations to international organiz[a]tions—there always will be KGB people or people fro[m] GRU, their military intelligence. They also conduct a long-term program of training people and putting them in place under false identities to stay for many years. Colonel Ab[el] [Rudolf Abel, a convicted Soviet spy, was returned to Russ[ia] in exchange for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1962] was an example of that. They have the benefit, of course, of indirect support from a variety of Communist parties arou[nd] the world.

Q. The Director of the FBI has said that there now are so many Soviet spies in America that he is having trouble trailing them. Why do we let so many in?

A. We let them in as diplomats, commercial travelers, in some other capacity. You have to realize that there has been a very large increase in the number of Soviet citizens in the United States, as compared with 10 years ago—partly a result of détente. Now, if you get an increase in Sovi[et] citizens in this country, you are inevitably going to get an increase in Soviet agents.

You see, in the Soviet Union the intelligence service is a very, very powerful institution because of its responsibiliti[es] for internal security as well as foreign intelligence. They have, in effect, merged the CIA, the FBI and our State police forces. And their intelligence service carries a very hig[h] degree of responsibility for preserving the power of th[e] Soviet state, for party discipline and for public discipline. Consequently, the KGB has an institutional power that is totally different from the FBI and CIA combined in ou[r] country.

I think our system makes us a better and a stronger nation.


WIDE WORLD


Dan Mitrione, an American murdered by guerrillas in Uru[guay], "was alleged to hav[e] been a CIA officer, which h[e] was not. It's reckless to name people as being identified with the CIA," says Mr. Colb[y]

A CHECK LIST OF RECENT IMPORTANT BOOKS ON INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

BARRON, John

KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents
(New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974)
(Paperback ed.: New York: Bantam Books, 1974)

An excellent, well written account of many major cases in which the KGB has been involved around the world. Also included are some details of the organization of the KGB. This is the best current book on the subject.

BOURKE, Sean

The Springing of George Blake
(New York: The Viking Press, 1970)
(Paperback ed.: New York: Pinnacle Books, 1971)

George Blake, a British intelligence officer, was a Soviet penetration agent. Eventually caught and imprisoned, this book is a well written and valuable account of the escape of Blake from a British prison, written by the Irishman who engineered the operation. This book not only provides the fascinating story of the escape plot, but also gives an insight into the personality of Blake and the operations of the KGB in the Soviet Union after Blake and Bourke were reunited in Moscow.

DE VOSJOLI, P. L. Thyraud

Lamia
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970)

The memoirs of the French career intelligence officer who served in the French Resistance during World War II, and who was also the liaison officer of the French Intelligence Service in Washington at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The book gives some important insights into the French Intelligence Service. A fictionalized version of Lamia, under the title of Topaz, written by Leon Uris, preceded it and was made into a movie.

FROLIK, JOSEF

The Frolik Defection
(London: Leo Cooper, 1975)

DULLES, Allen W.

The Craft of Intelligence
(New York: Harper & Row, 1963)
(Paperback ed.: New York: Signet Book, 1965)

The former Director of Central Intelligence (1953-1961), after touching on some of the early history of intelligence, examines many aspects of intelligence requirements, collection and production, describes the Communist intelligence services, and explores the uses of intelligence. With the authority of his own experience, he expounds the role of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community in the U. S. Government, up until the time he left office. (It should be noted that the paperback edition of this work has a little added material, particularly as to specific cases.)

HYDE, H. Montgomery

Room 3603: The Story of the British Intelligence Center in New York during World War II
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1963)
(Paperback ed.: New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964)

An anecdotal account of British secret intelligence operations in the United States and the Western Hemisphere during World War II, by a member of the staff of Sir William Stephenson, then Director of British Security Coordination in the United States. The book describes this organization's relationships with the FBI, the support it gave to General Donovan in establishing the OSS, and many BSC operations in intelligence collection, counterintelligence and covert action throughout the Western Hemisphere.

KAHN, David

The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing
(New York: Macmillan, 1967)
(Paperback ed., abridged,: New York: Signet Book, 1973)

A comprehensive history of secret communication from ancient times to the present. The book provides both an historical survey of cryptology and considerable information on the science and methodology. It is by far the most comprehensive work of its kind.

KENT, Sherman

Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949)
(Paperback ed.: Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966)

A foresighted early work on the theory and ideal operation of national intelligence production. The book lays down many of the principles which have subsequently been established in practice. The paperback edition contains a new 5000 word preface by Dr. Kent, reflecting his many years of experience as Chairman of the Board of National Estimates at CIA.

KIRKPATRICK, Lyman B., jr.

The Real CIA
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1968)

Describes the author's experiences in OSS and his long career in CIA, where he served in many positions, including those of Inspector General and Executive Director-Comptroller. It provides an insider's view of the development of CIA up until 1965.

KIRKPATRICK, Lyman B., jr.

The U. S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1973)
(Paperback ed.: New York: Hill and Wang, 1975)

A description of the roles, functions, and organization of the U. S. Intelligence Community, prior to Prof. Kirkpatrick's retirement from CIA in 1965. The book is the best available for that period, but does not reflect the many changes in the Community since that date. Nevertheless, it is important reading.

KOCH, Brigadier General Oscar W. with Robert G. Hays

G-2: Intelligence for Patton
(Philadelphia: Whitmore Publishing Co., 1971)

General Patton's successes on the battlefield in World War II could not have been accomplished without an effective intelligence effort and the commander's appreciation and use of the intelligence product. General Koch, Patton's G-2 in the North African, Sicily and European campaigns, relates his experiences with this controversial leader in a highly readable fashion. The insider's view of the intelligence support for Patton's operations, particularly during the Ardennes campaign, is of great interest and value to the student of military intelligence.

MASTERMAN, Sir John

The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1972)
(Paperback ed.: New York: Avon Books, 1972)

Masterman was Chairman of the British XX Committee during World War II. At the end of the War, he wrote this text as an official classified history. Release was authorized for publication by the British authorities in 1971. The book describes the highly complex and successful efforts of British Intelligence to neutralize, and in many cases to utilize, the services of every German agent in Britain during the War. A major text on counterintelligence and deception, the book is a veritable treatise on this type of work and the meticulous coordination which it requires.

[MORAVEC, General Frantisek]

Master of Spies: The Memoirs of General Frantisek Moravec
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1975)

General Moravec was the head of Czechoslovak Military Intelligence from 1937-1945. The book describes his efforts to develop this excellent service in the light of the General's certainty of on-coming hostilities with Germany. On the day that the Germans arrived in Prague, British Intelligence evacuated Moravec and eleven of his best officers to London, where they served for the duration. Following the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948, the General and his family again fled to the West, and the book includes nothing of his subsequent work. It is one of the finest memoirs of its kind by a first-class intelligence officer.

PENKOVSKIY, Oleg

The Penkovskiy Papers
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1965)
(Paperback ed.: New York: Avon Books, 1966)

The story of a Soviet intelligence officer who provided information of tremendous importance to British and American intelligence while continuing his service in the Soviet Union. The case constitutes one of the more significant Western intelligence coups in recent times and offers great benefit for those career intelligence officers who study it.

POPOV, Dusko

Spy/Counterspy: The Autobiography of Dusko Popov
(New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1974)
(Paperback ed.: Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1975)

Popov, while ostensibly working for the German Abwehr during World War II, was actually one of the best agents for the British in the Double Cross system (see Masterman, supra). He is agent "Tricycle" in the Masterman book, and his autobiography makes pleasant and informative reading about the life of an unusual double agent in that dangerous work.

SMITH, R. Harris

OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1972)

This book is the most complete story of OSS to date, but must be read with some caution. With access to virtually no classified files, the author has had to rely on the fading memories of many of the participants, as well as the rather inadequate published literature on the subject. This results in some errors of fact, which, taken with some biased views of the author, make for uneven reading.

STRONG, Major General Sir Kenneth W. D.

Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1969)

General Strong was a career British military intelligence officer who served as G-2 for General Eisenhower during World War II. After the War, he founded, and became the first Director of, the British Joint Intelligence Bureau. Subsequently, he became the first Director-General of Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence. This book relates General Strong's experiences during his intelligence career, his views of the role of intelligence in government, and important insights into the profession.

UNITED STATES. COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Report to the President
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, June 1975)

This is the report, findings and recommendations of President Ford's Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, chaired by Vice President Rockefeller. The Commission was established, following allegations in the press and elsewhere, to determine whether any domestic CIA activities exceeded the Agency's statutory authority. This is a clear and detailed account of CIA's activities in the domestic field, particularly in the light of the times and the circumstances under which they occurred. It is important reading for the professional intelligence officer.

DVORNIK, Francis

Origins of Intelligence Services: The Ancient Near East, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byantium, The Arab Muslim Empires, The Mongol Empire, China, Muscovy
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974)

Dr. Dvornik, born in Czechoslovakia, is a distinguished professor of history and political philosophies of ancient and medieval cultures, now associated with the Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine History (Harvard) at Washington. This scholarly work, begun in part for a post-war project initiated by General William J. Donovan as a private citizen, deals with the secret services of countries in the centuries before and after the birth of Christ. A unique work because of its total range over scholarly writings on these periods, it describes the rudimentary intelligence services of the empires described in the title. An essential work for those interested in the origins of intelligence services in ancient times.

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